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This thesis examines the main decisions taken in the 1994, 2001, and 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Reviews regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and declaratory strategy, and the 
policy debates that followed the publication of each NPR, focusing on deterrence and 
other objectives of U.S. national security strategy. It analyzes and compares the post–
Cold War NPRs to understand how each administration attempted to shape and direct 
policy, and how key issues were framed and addressed by policy makers and 
commentators. The concluding chapter identifies continuities and discontinuities in the 
NPRs, and considers how the roles of nuclear weapons, deterrence theory, and force 
structure have been addressed since the end of the Cold War. Continuities across the 
NPRs include the reduced role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, deterrence objectives keyed to 
contemporary threats, nuclear arms control with Russia, and a force structure that 
emphasizes diverse capabilities, including non-nuclear offensive and defensive assets. 
Fundamental issues concerning nuclear deterrence requirements for U.S. national security 
nonetheless remain unresolved, owing in part to fundamentally different policy views and 
priorities. U.S. deterrence objectives have remained fairly stable; definitions of 
deterrence requirements have changed markedly in each post–Cold War administration, 
with increasingly lower nuclear force levels. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
On three separate occasions since the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, the 
United States has conducted formal reviews of its nuclear posture. The Clinton 
Administration, the Bush Administration, and the Obama Administration prepared 
nuclear posture reviews (NPRs) and presented findings to Congress in 1994, 2001, and 
2010, respectively. The NPRs are important opportunities for administrations to define 
nuclear policy—at the declaratory level—and its relationship to national security 
strategy.1 Three post–Cold War administrations have completed three NPRs setting out 
broad guidelines for the role of nuclear weapons in national security and for the size and 
composition of the nuclear forces (two of the key elements of force posture).  
The primary research question of this thesis is: How has U.S. nuclear strategy 
regarding the requirements of deterrence and other U.S. national security objectives 
changed since the end of the Cold War as illustrated through the three nuclear posture 
reviews? This thesis will examine the main decisions taken in the 1994, 2001, and 2010 
Nuclear Posture Reviews regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and declaratory strategy, 
and the policy debates that followed the publication of each NPR, focusing on deterrence 
and other objectives of U.S. national security strategy.  
The post–Cold War period has seen numerous nuclear force reviews, reports, and 
studies. Scholars and teams of analysts from think tanks have advanced policy 
recommendations. Central to all of this work have been the NPRs. According to Hans 
Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, since the end of Cold War, the most 
important official (i.e., under the direction of the Department of Defense) defense 
reviews that impact nuclear policy have been the NPRs.2 The NPRs reviewed and made 
1 Courtney N. Stewart, “Should the Nuclear Posture Review be Conducted More Frequently?” in A 
Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, ed. Mark Jansson (Washington, DC: 
Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 39.  
2 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: 
A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Occasional Paper, no. 7, 
Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council, April 2009, 47. 
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recommendations affecting all dimensions of nuclear policy, but they were primarily (and 
most importantly) indications of declaratory policy. Key policy determinations, such as 
the recommendations arrived at in the NPRs, shape policy debates that influence thinking 
about nuclear weapons in national security.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
No comprehensive comparative study of the post–Cold War NPRs has been 
published. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
comprehensive discussions of future U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and force structure 
have been limited. Discussions about nuclear policy are often arguments over the merits 
of various policy positions or prescriptions, or focused on narrow conceptions of broader 
theories, like minimum deterrence or tailored deterrence. At the same time that issues 
relating to nuclear policy and strategy have faded in importance in the eyes of the 
American public and the Congress since the end of the Cold War, policy debates among 
analysts and experts have been intense at times. Joanna Spear described the realm of 
nuclear weapons policy as a “high–stakes game,” and observed that the decisions made 
through the NPRs may influence government programs and scientific activity for a 
decade or more.3 Glenn Buchan argued in 2002 around the time of the 2001 Bush 
administration NPR that a reassessment of nuclear strategy was “long overdue.”4 For 
Josiane Gabel, writing in 2004–2005, the time for a comprehensive debate over U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy was “overdue.”5 In her final major work, published 
posthumously in 2012, Thérèse Delpech called for a renaissance in nuclear thinking.6 A 
comparative study that informs future policy is important because nuclear policy is 
contentious, and there is little consensus across the various competing policy camps. The 
3 Joanna Spear, “More Business as Usual? The Obama Administration and the Nuclear Posture 
Review,” Contemporary Security Policy 32, no.1 (2011): 242. 
4 Glenn Buchan, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security: Strategy for a New Century,” in 
Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century, eds. Zalmay Khalilzad and 
Jeremy Shapiro (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 226. 
5 Josiane Gabel, “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11,” Washington Quarterly 28, 
no. 1 (2004–2005): 181. 
6 Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era 
of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 11. 
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overall purpose of this study is to advance understanding of prudent and effective policy, 
strategy, and force structure, and to evaluate the policy debates and assess the options for 
future U.S. nuclear force posture. This research can directly inform debates in the nuclear 
weapons policy analysis community.  
The overlapping fields of nuclear strategy and deterrence strategy have been at 
least partially neglected in the United States since the 1980s (and particularly since the 
end of the Cold War) as the focus of attention of scholars and analysts has shifted to 
specific nonproliferation and arms control issues.7 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne wrote 
in 1980 that strategy may be considered in a nuclear war context and indeed to not 
appreciate this idea is “to insure by choice a nuclear apocalypse if deterrence fails.”8 On 
the peculiar widespread inattention to nuclear weapons issues, Amy Woolf observed in 
2007 that nuclear weapons policy issues are of real concern to few outside a narrow 
specialist community.9 In 2011, James Blackwell observed that the U.S. Department of 
Defense maintained only one outdated doctrinal manual on campaigns encompassing 
nuclear weapons, the Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-72, Nuclear Operations.10 
The number of publications devoted to nuclear strategic topics (as opposed to more 
narrow, technical topics such as how warhead caps should be defined or how best to 
sustain effective stockpile stewardship in the absence of explosive nuclear testing) has 
dwindled since the end of the Cold War, and the number of scholars paying primary 
attention to nuclear strategic issues has gradually declined.  
The number of individuals paying serious, sustained, scholarly attention to 
nuclear strategy has always been small. There have been serious commentators and 
7 But consider some noteworthy post–1980 work: Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style 
(Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986); Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning 
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984); Keith B. Payne, “Post–Cold War Requirements for 
U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy,” Comparative Strategy 17, no. 3 (1998): 227–277; Richard Ned Lebow 
and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (1995): 
157–181; and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003).  
8 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 20, 26. 
9 Amy F. Woolf, “Congress and U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Review and Oversight of Policies and 
Programs,” Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 3 (2007): 513–514. 
10 James Blackwell, “Deterrence at the Operational Level of War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 
(2011): 37. 
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episodic commentators (the latter prompted to publish by an upcoming or recent policy 
event). Serious commentators have continued working core nuclear strategy and 
deterrence issues without significant disruption. Newer work that deserves scrutiny has 
been done by serious commentators such as Matthew Kroenig and Erik Gartzke.11  
In the early to mid–1980s, nuclear strategic issues were regularly discussed in 
specialized journals like International Security and Journal of Conflict Resolution, as 
well as in more general publications such as Foreign Affairs and World Politics. A good 
number of monographs were published during this same period by writers such as 
Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Janne Nolan, Scott Sagan, and Stephen Walt.12 Since 1991, 
discussions of nuclear strategic issues have gravitated more to the pages of the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, and The Nonproliferation Review, reflecting a 
growing focus on nonproliferation and disarmament issues, and to research institute and 
think tank publications rather than mainstream publications. A smaller stream of 
publications on serious policy and strategy topics has continued in Comparative Strategy 
and Survival, for example, despite the general shift away from nuclear strategy and 
nuclear weapons policy. Publications and wider interest in nuclear strategic issues have 
spiked during periods when an NPR is in progress and following its completion. These 
observations are based in part on the author’s survey of the scholarly literature.  
Public discussion about nuclear policy has tended to center on issues related to 
force levels (such as total treaty–accountable warheads) and force composition (land–
based, sea–based, and bomber–delivered systems). The contours of more serious policy 
11 Matthew Kroenig, “Think Again: American Nuclear Disarmament,” Foreign Policy 202 
(September–October 2013): 43–49; Erik Gartzke and Dong–Joon Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, 
and Interstate Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 209–233; Erik Gartzke and 
Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 3 (2014): 395–401; Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “A Strategic 
Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 151–160. 
12 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1987); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1984); Scott Douglas Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990); Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear 
Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 
International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–239. It should be noted that the works listed here 
represent a more traditional balance–of–power (or terror) perspective but that not all authors at the time 
ascribed to that perspective. 
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discussion have remained remarkably similar over time, including the meaning, role, and 
requirements for deterrence, and the value of deterrence. At least for some commentators, 
debates about nuclear strategy and posture since 1991 have been imbalanced, incomplete, 
and at least partially ineffective. Clark Murdock referred in 2008 to what appeared to be 
an “allergy” to anything nuclear by policy makers after the Cold War; he argued that 
while there were narrow debates about specific programs, such as research about the 
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), there were no broad debates about nuclear 
strategy or the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy in Washington.13 
Discussions about force posture that devolve to simplistic arguments over how many 
warheads are necessary for deterrence are among the least helpful for understanding the 
significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. More complete discussions 
of nuclear weapons policy and strategy would focus on the role, value, and requirements 
for deterrence. Important force structure issues concerning size, composition, readiness, 
modernization, and other issues have yet to be resolved. The resolution of central force 
structure issues can improve the internal consistency and effectiveness of policy, 
allowing for the effective retention of deterrence capability with a safe, secure, and 
reliable nuclear arsenal.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary research question is focused on the post–Cold War NPRs and how 
each report defined the role of nuclear weapons in national security. The broader question 
of what U.S. nuclear strategy should be in the current and future security environment is 
contentious, given the differing views and assumptions of various policy advocates about 
the minimum force size and effective force composition for deterrence. There are sharp 
differences in opinion among analysts over nuclear policy issues, including, to name only 
a few tied to the 2010 NPR, the urgency of going to zero (that is, abolishing the nuclear 
arsenal), how weapon stockpiles should be managed, and whether declaratory policy 
13 Clark A. Murdock, The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 27. 
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should be that U.S. nuclear weapons will only be used to counter nuclear threats.14 There 
are important differences of opinion among policy makers and analysts over the 
prudence, feasibility, and practicality of going to zero.  
U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and force structure are still informed by many Cold 
War conceptual frameworks, even though the international security environment has 
changed with respect to nuclear threats and the prospect of nuclear conflict since 1991. 
There is significant continuity in U.S. nuclear weapons policy since 1991 as stated in the 
NPRs, including a commitment to parity or better against any potential nuclear adversary 
and a first use option under certain circumstances. A comprehensive analysis of post–
Cold War NPRs indicates that policy continuities are as significant as discontinuities in 
explaining the actual key decisions of the NPRs. This thesis also examines areas of 
discontinuity such as the revised U.S. negative security assurance (NSA) in the 2010 
NPR.  
There is consensus among policy commentators that Cold War deterrence is at 
least partially obsolete, but there is disagreement over what form of deterrence is 
appropriate in the current security environment.15 For some analysts, the need to be able 
to assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat has continued, but low–confidence deterrence has 
replaced high–confidence, single–dynamic deterrence, reflecting a move from a 
structurally predictable international security environment to one of higher 
unpredictability. For example, Keith Payne has argued that “Many of the sophisticated 
deterrence concepts we developed during the Cold War specifically to prevent Soviet 
aggression, concepts in which we placed great confidence, can offer only an uncertain 
14 See Todd J. Schollars, Nuclear Deterrence: Strong Policy Is Needed for Effective Defense (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011). 
15 The term “Cold War deterrence” is not clearly defined but is used by leading nuclear weapons 
policy scholars. For example, Payne wrote in the mid–1990s: “The depth to which now–traditional Cold 
War deterrence thought has taken root in U.S. policy would be difficult to overstate. Cold War thinking 
about deterrence was popularized by the 1960s and came to be regarded as a reliable set of general axioms, 
including the proposition that nuclear deterrence serves to make large–scale war ‘unthinkable,’ and largely 
implausible.” Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1996), 15. Payne used the term multiple times in this work. For more on Cold War deterrence, 
see Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to 
the Twenty–first Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), Chs. 1–5. 
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basis for deterring contemporary foes.”16 Before the 1994 NPR, some writers argued that 
nuclear weapons should be marginalized—even if only gradually—in national security 
strategy.17 In fact, by 1994 the United States had unilaterally reduced its strategic nuclear 
forces by discarding 450 Minuteman II missiles, eliminating a number of Minuteman 
missile launchers, removing 14 ballistic missile submarines from service, and reorienting 
the B–1B bomber force to conventional missions.18 At the same time that the Clinton 
Administration was trying to deemphasize nuclear weapons in declaratory policy 
following the 1994 NPR, there were calls from disarmament and nonproliferation 
advocates for complete nuclear abolition.19 Other analysts argued that nuclear weapons 
and the threat of nuclear weapons use remain important in an uncertain security 
environment. Disagreements over the requirements to maintain U.S. deterrent credibility 
have helped to shape the post–Cold War NPRs and descend from the 1960s, when the 
Kahn–Schelling debates outlined two distinct conceptions of deterrence.20  
The NPRs have been seen as driving nuclear weapons policies even though 
analysts disagree over the extent to which they have always aligned with action policy. 
Some analysts in the late 1990s and early 2000s concluded that there was a significant 
16 Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age,” Comparative 
Strategy 23, no. 4–5 (2004): 412.  
17 See Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Survival 36, 
no. 4 (1994–1995): 73–95. The authors discussed the marginalist and traditionalist policy perspectives in 
detail, and listed the following works as representative of the marginalist approach: McGeorge Bundy, 
William J. Crowe, Jr., and Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear Danger: The Road Away from the Brink 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Graham Allison, Steven Miller, Ashton Carter, and 
Philip Zelikow, eds., Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds (Cambridge, MA: Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993); Roger C. Molander and Peter A. Wilson, “On 
Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos,” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1994): 19–39; and Andrew 
J. Goodpaster, Tighter Limits on Nuclear Arms: Issues and Opportunities for a New Era (Washington, DC: 
Atlantic Council of the United States, May 1992). 
18 Leslie Aspin, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1994), 61–62.  
19 For example, see Lee Butler, “The False God of Nuclear Deterrence,” Global Dialogue 1, no. 2 
(1999): 74–81; Craig Cerniello, “Retired Generals Re–Ignite Debate over Abolition of Nuclear Weapons,” 
Arms Control Today 26, no. 9 (1996): 14–15, 18. For a non–U.S. perspective, see Canberra Commission on 
the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 1996). 
20 For an analysis reviewing these debates, see Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: 
Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty–first Century (Fairfax, VA: National 
Institute Press, 2008). 
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disconnect between the 1994 NPR and action policy on nuclear issues under the Clinton 
Administration.21 Some observers have argued that the Obama Administration’s 2010 
NPR was essentially a public statement of policy. According to Hans Kristensen and 
Robert Norris, the 2010 NPR was a nuclear policy review rather than a nuclear posture 
review.22  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The decision making process for all three nuclear posture reviews was classified. 
The 1994 NPR resulted in no single final report, the 2001 NPR report was classified (no 
redacted version was ever released), and the 2010 NPR report was made public. All three 
NPRs were closely examined by Russia, China, and U.S. allies.23 The Obama 
Administration released the 2010 NPR as an unclassified document, which was in line 
with a general administration preference for policy transparency. Some nuclear policy 
analysts had pressed for a public report before completion of the 2010 NPR.24 Although 
the NPRs were classified, all three were discussed in multiple congressional hearings, and 
these transcripts are among the most important primary sources that bear on the central 
research question, as are official briefing materials prepared by individuals familiar with 
the reviews and with the classified versions of the NPR reports. Other official documents, 
21 For example, according to a 2003 RAND report: “Although the [1994] NPR was never made public, 
the general thrust was easy to discern from all the visible things that did not change…. The basic U.S. force 
structure has remained unchanged, although it will shrink substantially now that the Russian Duma has 
ratified START II.” Glenn Buchan, David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles 
of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 92. Kristensen 
was more direct in 1997: “When the review was completed in September 1994, little had changed. The 
Pentagon announced that it had changed the way it thought about nuclear weapons and reduced their role, 
although it reaffirmed nuclear deterrence and endorsed the continuation of the nuclear triad. Moreover, it 
granted nuclear weapons prominent roles in counterproliferation scenarios—several of which were deleted 
from the public version of the report.” Hans Kristensen, “Targets of Opportunity: How Nuclear Planners 
Found New Targets for Old Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 5 (1997): 24. 
22 See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s 
Words into Action,” Arms Control Today 41, no. 9 (2011): 12–19. Also see David Lonsdale, “Obama’s 
Second Term: Time for a New Discourse on Nuclear Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 32, no. 5 (2013): 
459–473; Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay, The End of Overkill? Reassessing U.S. 
Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2013).  
23 On international views, see Gary Samore, remarks at “International Perspectives on the Nuclear 
Posture Review,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 22, 2010.  
24 See, for example, William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and Charles D. Ferguson, Independent Task 
Force Report No. 62: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). 
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including National Security Strategy reports, Quadrennial Defense Review reports, and 
Secretary of Defense Annual Report documents provide the national security policy 
background and context for understanding the relevance of the NPRs to U.S. national 
security interests and strategic purposes. The most valuable secondary sources consist of 
scholarly studies by nuclear policy analysts and experts, especially the more serious 
scholars who have examined nuclear weapons policy issues consistently over time. Each 
NPR report generated a sizable amount of literature that attempted to clarify the issues 
and/or influence the shaping and implementation of policy.25  
Janne E. Nolan, who wrote prominent works on issues surrounding the 1994 
NPR, argued that experience with reviewing and establishing nuclear policy going back 
to the Eisenhower administration indicated the particular challenges with determining 
how much deterrence capability is sufficient, what the objectives of deterrence should be, 
and what costs should be paid to achieve deterrence.26 Her 1999 book, An Elusive 
Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War, is considered 
by some commentators to be an in–depth account of the 1994 NPR.27 Basing her 
conclusions on interviews with defense officials, Nolan focused on the failures of the 
1994 NPR to adequately address the post–Cold War threat environment. Other useful 
secondary sources include papers by Hans Kristensen and Paul Davis.28  
Several other literature surveys in the wake of the 1994 NPR are noteworthy. 
Josiane Gabel’s “The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11” provides an 
assessment of the nuclear weapons policy literature from the 1990s and post–9/11 era.29 
25 A good example is Andrew Grotto and Joseph Cirincione, Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture 
Review: A Roadmap (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2008). The authors argued that the 
Obama administration should use the 2009–2010 NPR to realign nuclear policy, forces, and posture to 
address the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation to new states. 
26 Janne E. Nolan, “Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,” Arms Control Today 30, no. 9 
(2000): 10–14. 
27 Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold 
War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999). 
28 Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” working paper, Nautilus 
Institute, Berkeley, CA, 2000; Paul K. Davis, Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions about 
Nuclear Forces and Postures (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011). 
29 Gabel, “Nuclear Weapons after September 11,” 181. 
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Michael R. Boldrick discussed the 1994 NPR directly in a 1995 Parameters article, “The 
Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks,” in which he focused on the strategic 
forces, non-strategic forces, and infrastructure recommendations in the NPR report.30 
Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, in their 1994 Survival article, “The Future of 
U.S. Nuclear Policy,” explained why the 1994 NPR was well–received by some 
observers and openly criticized by others, and discussed major schools of thought 
concerning the role of strategic nuclear weapons in U.S. policy.31 In the late 1990s, Leon 
Sloss, a veteran nuclear policy expert, outlined two major schools of thought in the 
United States about the role of nuclear weapons: the first saw maintaining nuclear 
weapons as dangerous to national security and conferring few strategic benefits; the 
second saw continuing utility in maintaining nuclear arsenals and perceived a wider role 
for nuclear deterrence.32  
The end of the Cold War and reduced tension between the United States and 
Russia in the 1990s suggested for many analysts that there was an opportunity for 
substantial nuclear arms reductions, but there was no corresponding consensus (noted 
some commentators) on what role nuclear weapons should play in national security. Kurt 
Guthe explained, however, that there was a kind of consensus among serious scholars and 
commentators, reflected in a general national political consensus between Democratic 
and Republican administrations, and that some “lack of consensus” arguments skewed 
debates to one side, the side favored more by the superficial commentators.33 Warren 
Stern wrote in 1997 that there was an essential psychological factor—or a “nuclear 
conception,” as Stern put it—underlying nuclear policy making that went “deeper” than 
the Cold War conflict.34 Stern’s point suggested that no major nuclear policy or nuclear 
30 Michael R. Boldrick, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks,” Parameters 25 (Winter 
1995–1996): 80–91.  
31 Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Survival 36, no. 4 
(1994–1995): 73–95.  
32 See Leon Sloss, The Current Nuclear Dialogue, Report, no. 156 (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999). 
33 See Kurt Guthe, Ten Continuities in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Strategy, Plans, and Forces 
(Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2008). 
34 Warren Stern, New Nuclear Conceptions: How We Have Changed the Way We Think About Nuclear 
Weapons and Why it Matters (Washington, DC: National War College, 1997).  
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strategy changes would take place that did not involve a change in the underlying nuclear 
conception, and that the underlying nuclear conception might contribute to the perceived 
lack of ability for policy makers to substantially change nuclear policy.  
Analysts and policy advocates divided roughly into marginalists and 
traditionalists, corresponding to the ideas of minimizing or sustaining the role of nuclear 
weapons in national security. The marginalizers saw a path to nuclear abolition in 
constructive nuclear arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia, 
whereas the “traditionalists” preferred to see no radical changes in the U.S. nuclear 
posture and did not see the strategic relevance of nuclear weapons in terms substantially 
different from those that prevailed during the Cold War.35 Despite the marginalists’ 
arguments complaining about high U.S. force levels, 50 percent cuts under President 
George H.W. Bush, then 50 percent cuts again under President George W. Bush, together 
with the unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992, represent significant 
force posture changes (especially from the viewpoint of traditionalists).36 Two of the 
most salient recommendations to come from proponents of marginalization were de–
alerting and adoption of a no–first–use policy—recommendations rejected by 
traditionalists as damaging to U.S. national security interests. De–alerting proposals were 
closely tied to disarmament.37 De–altering was a long–standing issue in nuclear policy 
debates but not specifically a topic for all three NPRs.  
What is remarkable about nuclear strategy debates in the 1990s is that they were 
not especially vigorous. This is not to say that some specialists did not vigorously argue 
for their policy agendas. The critics of official policy included William Arkin, Robert 
35 See CSIS Nuclear Strategy Study Group, Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons 
in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1993). 
36 For more on the PNIs, see Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
2012).  
37 See Tim Miller and Rebecca Davis, De–Alerting Nuclear Forces (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: 
Institute for National Security Studies, 2009), 9–10.  
 11 
                                                 
Norris, and Hans Kristensen.38 Central to nuclear strategy in the 1990s was the Single 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which some writers claimed was virtually unchanged 
from the Cold War.39 The central debate about nuclear strategy in the 1990s, which went 
unresolved, was whether it was in U.S. national security interests to maintain an updated 
SIOP or to scrap a unified plan entirely and replace it with a more flexible approach that 
would be, it was argued, more relevant to current security threats. Despite sporadic 
debate, little was actually resolved on this issue until 2002–2003.  
Colin Gray noted in 1990 that nuclear strategy debates were spurred by higher 
governmental pronouncements. “It has tended to be the political agenda of presidents,” 
wrote Gray, “which periodically has jumpstarted strategic debate. Presidential, or at least 
cabinet–level, announcements and speeches typically have been the major engine of 
strategic debate.”40 This is mainly how nuclear strategy—and the NPRs—have been 
publically debated.  
An important development during the 1990s was Presidential Decision Directive 
60 (PDD-60)—the newest strategic nuclear employment guidance since 1981—signed by 
President Bill Clinton in November 1997.41 The implications of PDD-60 for U.S. nuclear 
strategy figured prominently in some public discussions, especially in 1997. According to 
a 2001 Natural Resources Defense Council report, PDD-60 was the most significant 
policy change to affect nuclear war planning in the 1990s because it removed explicit 
references to protracted nuclear war, but it sustained the practice of targeting Russian 
leadership and nuclear forces and permitted targeteers to expand the list of potential 
38 See Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s”; Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. 
Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and William M. Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change 
(Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001). 
39 For background on the history of U.S. nuclear attack planning, see Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting 
MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). 
40 Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: What is True, What is False, What is Arguable,” Comparative 
Strategy 9, no. 1 (1990): 2. 
41 Among other sources on PDD–60, see David Kunsman and Douglas B. Lawson, A Primer on U.S. 
Strategic Nuclear Policy (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratory, 2001); and Tom Sauer, Nuclear 
Inertia: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005). For a contemporary 
view, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms: Centering on 
Deterrence, Officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997, A1. 
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targets in China.42 According to Craig Cerniello, PDD-60 reaffirmed the policy of 
deterrence and the primary role of nuclear weapons for deterrence.43 PDD-60 ratified, so 
to speak, the primary recommendations of the 1994 NPR.  
Keith B. Payne, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces 
Policy in 2002–2003, wrote extensively between 2001 and 2009 to correct what he 
regarded as a host of errors in interpretations of the 2001 NPR. Payne was acknowledged 
as the primary influence (the “principal architect”) behind the 2001 NPR.44 He held that 
mistaken impressions about the 2001 NPR were the result of commentators using 
obsolete Cold War era concepts about nuclear strategy and deterrence requirements.45 
Payne contended that the post–September 11 (indeed post–Cold War) world included a 
much longer list of potential adversaries that the U.S. needed to deter, as compared to the 
Cold War period, that there was much more variety in the contexts in which deterrence 
needed to be achieved, and that the stakes involved were generally more variable and less 
predictable, necessitating a fundamental reassessment of the deterrence concepts 
developed during the Cold War.46 Payne and his colleagues were dedicated scholars who 
tried to clearly articulate and focus on the issues surrounding deterrence rationales and 
requirements in the post–Cold War security environment.  
Richard Sokolsky and other authors attempted to explain the core concepts of the 
2001 NPR. Sokolsky concluded that, while many of the criticisms of the 2001 NPR had 
been exaggerated and that many critics had failed to appreciate that it might have 
enhanced deterrence, the review also failed to deliver promised changes in nuclear 
strategy and posture, and did not prompt needed changes to the U.S.–Russian nuclear 
42 McKinzie et al., The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change, 10. 
43 Craig Cerniello, “Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine,” Arms 
Control Today 27, no. 8 (1997): 23. 
44 H.A.S.C. No. 110–73: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Hearing before the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 
2008, 1. 
45 Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” Washington Quarterly 
28, no. 3 (2005): 135–151.  
46 See Payne, “Deterrence for a New Age,” 411–414. For a more extensive analysis, see Keith B. 
Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2001). 
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relationship.47 Russia’s central role in shaping the U.S. nuclear force posture persisted 
through the 2010 NPR.  
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press are widely cited commentators on nuclear weapons 
policy, including the issue of U.S. nuclear primacy and U.S. nuclear deterrence. Lieber 
and Press claimed that the nuclear balance had shifted significantly since the Cold War, 
driven primarily by declining Russian arsenals and improvements in the accuracy of U.S. 
nuclear weapon systems, that the United States was nearing nuclear primacy, and that the 
U.S. edge would grow if Russia and China did not commit the resources necessary to 
reestablish a counterbalancing deterrent.48 In their counterargument on U.S. nuclear 
primacy, Bruce Blair and Chen Yali questioned why Lieber and Press assumed that 
improved U.S. nuclear forces would create less international security, and asked how 
they had calculated that the United States had such a first–strike superiority as to threaten 
long–standing strategic stability. Blair and Yali concluded: “In an ironic twist of fate, the 
weakness of America’s adversaries only undermines U.S. and global security.”49  
The overarching debate to emerge from the 2001 NPR concerning future force 
structure was whether the Cold War triad was sufficient or whether a new form of the 
nuclear triad was necessary to support U.S. national strategic objectives. Some analysts 
argued that the triad needed to be reformulated to more closely reflect twenty–first 
century threats and defense policy goals. The implications of the George W. Bush 
Administration’s new triad—comprised of strike means, nuclear and conventional; 
defensive capabilities, active and passive; and a responsive defense–industrial 
infrastructure—were examined and debated in military service publications and were the 
topic of a number of advanced military service school papers and theses.50 Since some 
47 Richard Sokolsky, “Demystifying the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” Survival 44, no. 3 (2002): 
133–148.  
48 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” 
International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 7–44.  
49 Bruce Blair and Chen Yali, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy,” China Security (Autumn 2006): 51. 
50 Examples include Heidi A. Paulson, Toward a New “New Triad” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 
Air Command and Staff College, 2009); David Fiely, National Strategy and Implementation of the New 
Triad—Congruent or Divergent? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002); and Christopher 
G. Owens, The Promise and Peril of the New Strategic Triad (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 2003). 
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commentators interpreted the Bush administration’s New Triad as an attempt to restart 
the development of new nuclear weapons designs, while others argued that it would 
undermine nonproliferation efforts, the topic also captured the attention of policy analysts 
such as David McDonough, Kurt Guthe, and Sidney Drell.51  
With the publication of the 2010 NPR many of the same core issues of the role of 
nuclear weapons in a post–Cold War security environment were reopened by 
commentators and analysts. The pattern of debates over deterrence requirements has 
repeated; the core issues have remained remarkably consistent—the purposes, rationales, 
and usefulness of nuclear weapons. The related policy questions have not been fully 
resolved because of the deep–seeded convictions behind competing answers. What made 
this round of public debates unique was President Obama’s prominent public declaration 
in April 2009 in Prague committing the United States to the objective of working toward 
the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Joanna Spear, in her article, “More Business 
as Usual? The Obama Administration and the Nuclear Posture Review,” applied a 
bureaucratic politics model to identify three distinct policy camps (made up of 
individuals in and out of government) that quickly organized to shape the preparation of 
the 2010 NPR: the “facilitators” worked to establish at least some permanent architecture 
to promote President Obama’s policy (to set the nation on a denuclearization path); the 
“neutrals” backed ongoing arms control negotiations and associated efforts and did not 
see the President’s nuclear disarmament policy as threatening; and the “blockers” were 
committed to heading off any substantial scaling back of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
enterprise.52  
It could also be said that President Obama’s fundamental reordering of policy 
goals with respect to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament was the most influential 
step reflected in the 2010 NPR report. The 2010 NPR touched off debate about the 
51 David S. McDonough, “The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review: The ‘New Triad,’ Counterproliferation, 
and U.S. Grand Strategy,” Working Paper 38, Institute of International Relations, University of British 
Columbia, 2003; Kurt Guthe, The Nuclear Posture Review: How Is the “New Triad” New? (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002); and Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, 
What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces 
(Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 2005). 
52 Spear, “More Business as Usual,” 241. 
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particular challenges and threats of reducing to very low nuclear arms levels (aspects of 
this debate reach back to the 1990s).53 Competing arguments over abolition—and what 
some authors have called “delegitimization”—have been revived, but they are not 
significantly different from those advanced in earlier generations of disarmament 
thinking.54  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis presents a study of the three post–Cold War NPRs on the basis of 
primary and secondary sources. This thesis analytically surveys the policy debates that 
followed each NPR. The purpose is to analyze decisions and debates about the NPRs in a 
comparative study that includes examining the NPRs (and related documents, reports, 
and testimony) as policy, and assessing the surrounding debates as part of the policy 
making process. Considering the continuities and discontinuities in the U.S. nuclear 
posture, this thesis analyzes and compares the post–Cold War NPRs to understand how 
each administration attempted to shape and direct policy, and how key issues were 
framed and addressed by policy makers and policy commentators.  
A comparative approach to the study of the post–Cold War NPRs provides a solid 
foundation for understanding nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure. This 
research suggests that the three NPRs proposed a similar force structure. What becomes 
clearer through a comparative analysis is that the declaratory policy surrounding the force 
structure was advanced differently and these differences affected the related policy 
debates (at times significantly, as in the case of the George W. Bush administration and 
so–called bunker–busters, and the Obama administration and nuclear disarmament). The 
policy debates have had some impact on nuclear weapons policy making (as well as on 
subsequent NPRs) but the impact has been limited at times. The NPRs are both 
53 On the issues of very low nuclear weapons levels, see National Academy of Sciences Staff, The 
Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 77–83.  
54 Issues relating to “global zero” are discussed in Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds., Getting 
to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Abolition and 
nonproliferation are not directly relevant to the primary research question in this thesis, but these issues are 
pertinent to questions of policy and force structure (especially force levels). See Clark A. Murdock, John C. 
Browne, Francis Slakey, Benn Tannenbaum, and Jessica Yeats, Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. 
National Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). 
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statements of policy and agendas for action, and they provide a window into official 
thinking on nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure. The NPRs influence 
U.S. policies concerning (among other activities) arms control, nuclear weapons complex 
and infrastructure modernization, nonproliferation, and counter–proliferation. This thesis 
examines the debates in academic journals, policy papers, and conference reports because 
this work attempted to influence the preparation of the NPRs and to shape their 
implementation. Debating the implications of the NPRs was a central dynamic in their 
production and use as official policy guidance.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Because this is a comparative analysis of national security policy documents, each 
main section of the thesis examines one NPR, and each main body section follows the 
same format. The first section of each chapter examines primary sources related to the 
NPR, including the DOD Annual Reports and statements by high–level DOD officials, 
including the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, to clearly identify the most important policy decisions 
and recommendations. The second section of each chapter examines the views of key 
commentators with different policy agendas and interests. Chapters II, III, and IV focus 
on the NPRs in 1994, 2001, and 2010 respectively. Chapter V synthesizes the ideas and 
conclusions from the previous chapters in an effort to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the post–Cold War development of U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and 
force structure. The concluding chapter identifies continuities and discontinuities in the 
NPRs, and considers how the role of nuclear weapons, deterrence theory, and force 
structure has been addressed since the end of the Cold War.  
This thesis does not deal directly with proliferation, nonproliferation, or arms 
control as distinct policy topics. The focus is on declaratory policy as developed through 
the NPRs. The NPRs are essentially expressions of declaratory policy, though they make 
reference to (and are intended to affect) all dimensions of nuclear policy. The focus is on 
the immediate results (recommendations or key decisions) of the NPRs. In other words, 
the thesis concentrates on the reviews, as indicated by reports, testimony, and other 
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sources, and the primary public discussions about the NPRs, not on the reviews as 
decision–making processes. The NPRs are important manifestations of official nuclear 
policy and strategy but not the only component. Administrations have wider and more 
technical nuclear policies, but the focus here, primarily for clarity, is on the declaratory 
dimension of the NPRs.  
 18 
II. THE 1994 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reported U.S. strategic nuclear forces for the 
end of fiscal year 1993 in his 1993 Annual Report, before the completion of the 1994 
NPR, as 227 Minuteman II ICBMs, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, 
96 C-4 SLBMs on 8 Poseidon SSBNs, 192 C-4 SLBMs on 8 Trident I SSBNs, 144 D-5 
SLBMs on 6 Trident II SSBNs, 95 B-52Hs, and 96 B-1Bs.55 These were the essential 
elements of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure at the end of the Cold War in 1989–
1991. As Keith Payne has observed, U.S. Cold War deterrence requirements were based 
on a “balance of terror” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and assumed rational leaders; 
confidence in the stability of the nuclear balance of terror was so high that it was 
sometimes referred to as existential deterrence.56 The Cold War force structure matured 
to support the deterrence strategy often called mutual assured destruction (or MAD).57 
The START I Treaty was meant to reduce the force levels called for under MAD, and the 
1994 Nuclear Posture Review was meant to arrive at post–START force posture.58 The 
1994 NPR was meant to move the United States away from MAD and its supporting 
force structure and posture.  
55 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 1993), 68.  
56 Keith B. Payne, “Moving Beyond the Cold War’s Nuclear ‘Balance of Terror,’” Comparative 
Strategy 23, no. 2 (2004): 121–122. 
57 “From the early 1960s through the end of the Cold War, the strategic nuclear balance among the 
great powers was characterized by mutual assured destruction. Any attack by one side against another 
would leave the victim with more than enough deliverable nuclear warheads to exact terrible retribution 
against the aggressor’s homeland.” Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” 11. 
58 The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 
1991, but due to the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, START did not enter into effect until three 
years later. By December 2001, the United States and Russia had cut their numbers of deployed strategic 
delivery vehicles to less than 1,600 and their attributed warheads to less than 6,000. See “Fact Sheet: The 
Legacy of START and Related U.S. Policies,” Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, 
July 16, 2009. 
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A. KEY DECISIONS  
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin identified “dramatic nuclear reductions” as an 
“opportunity” in the 1993 Bottom–Up Review.59 In the early 1990s, it seemed that some 
policy makers saw geopolitical circumstances as presenting an opportunity to reduce 
nuclear arsenals. Secretary Aspin explained in his 1994 Annual Report how the 
international strategic environment facing the United States had changed from the Cold 
War, but still included tens of thousands of nuclear weapons deployed in parts of the 
former Soviet Union, and how U.S. strategic nuclear forces and strategic deterrence 
would continue as critical components of national security strategy.60 The key 1994 NPR 
decisions were captured by the “lead and hedge” strategy and policy (a force level–
dominated concept), encompassing force reductions with flexibility to respond to 
unexpected developments by re-achieving previous force levels. The 1994 NPR 
influenced nuclear strategy and deterrence requirements, but its key decisions were more 
shaped by political and fiscal pressures driving force levels down than by the 
administration’s policy preferences. The authors of the 1994 NPR set out to construct a 
nuclear force posture for the post–Cold War era; the 1994 NPR was a review to establish 
nuclear force structure requirements consistent with future START II force levels.  
1. Role of Nuclear Weapons  
The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy and strategy has been influenced by 
the perception of the weapons as tools of last resort, reserved for the most grave 
situations and worst threats, given their immense destructiveness. President George H.W. 
Bush told Vice President Dan Quayle and others in a 1989 Presidential Directive that 
nuclear weapons were “ultimate guarantors” of national security.61 In considering the 
purposes of nuclear weapons, the 1994 NPR identified three threat–related problems that 
59 Leslie Aspin, Report on the Bottom–Up Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), 
2. 
60 Aspin, 1994 Annual Report, 147. 
61 “Review of National Defense Strategy,” Confidential, National Security Review, NSR 12, March 3, 
1989, Presidential Directives, Part II, Item Number: PR01789. Executive Office of the President, From: 
Bush, George To: Quayle, J. Danforth et al., 1, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CPR01789. 
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might influence changes to the U.S. nuclear force posture: a reversal of political reform in 
Russia and the emergence of a government in Moscow antagonistic to the United States; 
a slower force drawdown in Russia than in the United States; and arrangements for the 
security of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union.62 The 1991 
National Security Strategy stated that, unlike the unitary actor that predominated in 
nuclear strategic thinking during the Cold War, the United States would need to consider 
state leaders other than those of the Soviet Union prepared to use WMD.63 In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, however, there were still attempts to seize opportunities for 
major changes to national security policy. In his 1993 Annual Report, Secretary Cheney 
indicated that there were important opportunities to reduce the levels of certain kinds of 
weapons, referred to as “the most destabilizing,” including MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, 
to increase strategic stability.64 The roles of U.S. nuclear weapons have been related to 
their perceived fundamental purposes.  
The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review considered various purposes of nuclear 
weapons and the relation of these purposes to central deterrence, extended deterrence, 
regional challengers, and WMD threats. A group of RAND authors in 2003 explained the 
primary roles of strategic nuclear forces as deterring large–scale “strategic” attacks and 
delivering massive amounts of destruction against an adversary, but noted that there 
could be other uses, including tactical employment, and that the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
included nuclear weapons for that purpose.65 Experts have pointed out that nuclear 
weapons do not have an intrinsic “sole purpose” quality: to only deter nuclear attack. 
Regarding extended deterrence, Secretary of Defense William Perry asserted in his 1995 
Annual Report that “the United States has not only a national deterrent posture, but an 
62 U.S. Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1994), 45. Since there was no published report of the 1994 NPR, 
this document is comprised of the Department of Defense briefing slides titled “Nuclear Posture Review,” 
Secretary Perry’s Stimson Center remarks (September 20, 1994), the news release, “DOD Review 
Recommends Reductions in Nuclear Force,” September 22, 1994, and the press conference with Perry, 
Chairman of the JCS Shalikashvili, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch (September 22, 1994).  
63 George H.W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1991), 26. 
64 Cheney, 1993 Annual Report, 4.  
65 Buchan et al., Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 47. 
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international nuclear posture,” grounded on non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), which 
were not addressed by START I or START II, and which focused on regions considered 
vital to U.S. national interests.66 According to the 1992 National Military Strategy, the 
purpose of nuclear weapons was to deter WMD and major conventional threats.67 The 
1992 NMS had already spelled out a need for more flexible, regionally–focused security 
approaches. The 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review observed that a regional power 
armed with WMD could threaten a neighbor to not request U.S. security assistance, 
threaten U.S. force concentrations, threaten ports necessary for U.S. force movements, 
and threaten U.S. population centers with “covertly delivered weapons or, eventually, 
ballistic or cruise missiles.”68 Congressional hearings on threats to national security in 
1997 identified WMD proliferation and nuclear–armed rogue states as primary 
concerns.69 Nuclear weapons were not viewed officially by policy makers as sole–
purpose tools.  
Nuclear weapons serve multiple functions in national security and have been seen 
as reinforcing alliances. Analysts have discussed the foreign policy functions of nuclear 
weapons beyond the simple, counter–nuclear weapons threat role. Colin Gray and Keith 
Payne argued in 1980 that nuclear weapons back up foreign policy and strengthen critical 
alliances, and that nuclear weapons have utility in making coercive threats, even when 
couched within “politically defensive” aims.70  
Nuclear weapons may enhance security guarantees by making U.S. military 
capabilities appear more robust. In his 1992 Annual Report, Secretary of Defense Cheney 
suggested that nuclear weapons “support” the global power role of the United States and 
66 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1995), 88–89.  
67 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1992), 13. 
68 Aspin, Bottom–Up Review, 5. 
69 H.N.S.C. No. 105–11: Threats to U.S. National Security, Hearing Before the Committee on National 
Security, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 1. 
70 Gray and Payne, “Victory Is Possible,” 20.  
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its key alliances, including NATO.71 John M. Deutch, then the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, testified in 1994 that nuclear weapons allow the United States to reliably deter 
other states with nuclear weapons from threatening the United States or its allies.72 In his 
1995 Annual Report, William Perry linked roles and missions to force level requirements 
to counter threats, arguing that “The United States must maintain nuclear forces of 
sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially 
hostile nations.”73 At the time of the 1994 NPR, conceptions of the roles and purposes of 
nuclear weapons were developed in light of the Cold War experience and assessments of 
probable post–Cold War requirements.  
2. Theory of Deterrence  
Key decisions of the 1994 NPR were made in light of arms control and 
nonproliferation objectives. Secretary Perry wrote in his 1995 Annual Report that the 
1994 NPR called for unilateral posture changes aligned with arms control agreements 
made possible by the new “pragmatic partnership” between the United States and 
Russia.74 The 1998 National Security Strategy made repeated references to 
nonproliferation. The 1998 NSS highlighted the value of nuclear weapons in deterring 
“aggression and coercion” through a “robust” triad and fully maintained infrastructure, 
and—capping changes outlined in PDD-60—described nuclear planning as focused on 
deterring nuclear war, not winning nuclear war.75 There was substantial continuity of 
concepts across national strategic documents—including DOD annual reports and 
NSSs—on core nuclear posture issues and topics, including the nuclear triad, the nuclear 
complex, forward deployment, and extended deterrence, from the 1994 NPR through the 
late 1990s. In his 1997 Annual Report, Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared that 
START I was the first treaty to actually reduce the superpowers’ deployed strategic 
71 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 1992), 7.  
72 H. Hrg.: U.S. Nuclear Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1995, 8.  
73 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 163.  
74 Ibid., 91.  
75 William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1998), 12. 
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offensive weapon systems, and that START I mandated the reduction of accountable 
strategic warheads by more than 40 percent and reduced strategic delivery vehicles 
(SDVs) by about one–third over three phases, with final levels to be accomplished by 
December 2001.76 The 1994 NPR was intimately tied to arms control from the start as it 
was expected to recommend force structure for START II.  
The 1994 NPR considered strategic deterrence at lower nuclear force levels. 
According to a USSTRATCOM memorandum, the 1994 NPR reaffirmed the continued 
importance of deterrence.77 In discussing the 1994 NPR, Secretary Perry emphasized the 
substitution of Mutual Assured Safety (or MAS) for MAD—an apparently different way 
of conceiving of strategic deterrence—and the strategy of “leading and hedging.”78 Perry 
called for a new approach to thinking about nuclear weapons, and he evidently believed 
that the 1994 NPR had defined one. Despite a changed strategic environment and the 
need for force reductions, according to testimony by Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Walter Slocombe in 1997, the 1994 NPR concluded that the United States should 
continue relying on a strategic deterrent role for nuclear weapons because encouraging 
international security developments might reverse course dramatically and 
unexpectedly.79 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, 
Edward Warner, explained in 1998 that the 1994 NPR had led to substantial changes in 
76 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1997), 56. The strategic delivery vehicles covered in START I included ICBMs, SLBMs, 
and strategic bombers.  
77 “Overview of Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Results,” United States Strategic Command, ca. 
September 22, 1994, 1.  
78 The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, 48. 
79 S. Hrg. 105–159: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence, Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 
1997, 10.  
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force posture and had eliminated nuclear weapons on Navy surface ships.80 Warner 
suggested that the 1994 NPR and the earlier PNIs together resulted in a stockpile 
decrease of “more than” 50 percent, and even more significantly, U.S. unilateral NSNF 
reductions to “one–tenth of Cold War levels.”81 The 1994 NPR apparently conceived of 
strategic deterrence in substantially the same terms as during the Cold War. MAD was 
described as obsolete (at least in part, because there was no unitary Soviet adversary), but 
not effectively replaced. Perry spoke of MAS, but it apparently did not take hold 
officially in Washington or Moscow. Despite real posture changes, the 1994 NPR did not 
measurably alter conceptions of the fundamental deterrence purpose of U.S. nuclear 
forces.  
Issues relating to extended deterrence and nuclear proliferation influenced key 
decisions of the 1994 NPR. Important recommendations were made regarding NSNF 
(including remarkable reductions) and allied commitments, including maintaining NATO 
commitments. The 1994 NPR recommended continuing the commitment to NATO of 
dual–capable aircraft based in Europe and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, 
keeping continental U.S.-based dual–capable aircraft, ending the option to deploy nuclear 
weapons on carrier–based dual–capable aircraft, removing the option to carry nuclear–
armed cruise missiles on surface ships, and retaining the capability to deploy nuclear–
armed cruise missiles on submarines.82 “The effect of the NSNF recommendations,” the 
NPR stressed, “is to eliminate the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on surface naval 
80 “Since the end of the Cold War, our nuclear deterrent posture has dramatically changed. Under the 
1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, we decided to: eliminate our entire inventory of ground–launched 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance surface–to–surface missiles); remove all 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day–to–day basis from surface ships, attack submarines and land–based 
naval aircraft bases; remove our strategic bombers from alert; stand down the Minuteman II ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] scheduled for deactivation under START I; terminate the mobile 
Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM programs; and terminate the SRAM–II nuclear short–range attack 
missile. In January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took further steps which included: 
limiting B–2 production to 20 bombers, canceling the entire small ICBM program, ceasing production of 
W–88 Trident SLBM [submarine–launched ballistic missiles] warheads, halting purchases of advanced 
cruise missiles, and stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles.” The 1994 NPR “eliminated even 
the capability to deploy nuclear weapons (bombs and cruise missiles) on Navy surface ships.” U.S. 
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Speech, Nuclear 
Deterrence Force Still Essential, Prepared statement by Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 31, 1998. 
81 Ibid.  
82 The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, 39. 
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ships, while maintaining a non-strategic force capability to fulfill our commitments to 
allies.”83  
In his 1995 Annual Report, Secretary of Defense Perry repeated some of the ideas 
(and used similar language) regarding alliance commitments and NSNF, suggesting that 
the NPR recommendations had been adopted. The 1994 NPR took key alliance 
commitments and the “unique characteristics” of NSNF into account and considered 
multiple force postures (including an option that completely eliminated NSNF), but 
retained an NSNF capability to fulfil alliance security guarantees.84 In 1995, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, in the National Military Strategy, linked 
extended deterrence and nonproliferation through the idea of maintaining forward 
deployed and deployable NSNF, arguing that extended deterrence was decisive to U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts.85 Shalikashvili also laid out explicitly the notion of WMD 
proliferation as a strategic threat.86  
Countering nuclear proliferation was part of the 1994 NPR. The 1994 Annual 
Report described the evolving “nature of strategic deterrence,” referring to actions by the 
United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to observe the requirements of 
START, and specified the policy goals of reducing the threat from remaining Soviet 
nuclear weapons and countering nuclear proliferation.87 The 1994 NPR appeared to 
explicitly put alliance commitments at the center of considerations and important 
recommendations were made with a view to maintaining extended deterrence.  
3. Force Structure  
Key force structure decisions of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review incorporated 
START I force levels, the concept of “lead and hedge,” and 2003 (post–START II) 
expected force levels. The publically available 1994 NPR briefing slides concluded with 
83 Ibid. 
84 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 89. 
85 John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 10. 
86 Ibid., i.  
87 Aspin, 1994 Annual Report, 62, 270. 
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the themes of a reduced role for nuclear weapons in national security, counter 
proliferation, reversibility (if Russian political reform failed), and nuclear stockpile 
stewardship.88 The primary NPR results with respect to strategic force levels included 
decisions to: maintain no more than 20 B–2 bombers in the nuclear role, reduce the B–52 
bomber force from 94 to 66, reduce Trident submarine fleet numbers from 18 to 14, 
modernize the SLBM force for an extended service life by arming all submarines with D–
5 missiles, maintain 500/450 single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, and maintain 
flexibility for subsequent force level cuts or force reconstitution.89  
The 1994 NPR force level recommendations—which supported the Clinton 
administration policy of “lead and hedge”—centered on a requirement of 3,500 weapons, 
given full implementation of the START II treaty.90 In 1995, Perry addressed force levels 
and threats, including Russia. He explained that the 1994 NPR analyzed various force 
structures, from ones that increased systems to a minimal force without ICBMs and ten 
SSBNs, and that the recommended 1994 NPR force structure (which included “hedge” 
forces) accepted by President Clinton was based on Russian ratification and successful 
implementation of START II.91  
The U.S. policy approach to force levels under START I and START II appeared 
to change in 1996. Recognizing that the Russian parliament had still not ratified START 
II and accepting that the strategic role of nuclear weapons had declined, in his 1996 
Annual Report Perry explained that the United States would “hedge”—at an “affordable 
cost”—by keeping options to maintain forces under START I levels until Russian 
ratification of START II and the initiation of treaty–mandated reductions.92  
In 1994, Perry explained the motivations behind “leading and hedging.” The 
United States was in a position to lead arms reductions to reduce defense spending and 
88 The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, 35. 
89 Ibid., 36.  
90 See S. Hrg. 103–870: Briefing on Results of the Nuclear Posture Review, Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1994. Also see Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 83–92. 
91 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 87.  
92 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 1996), 15. 
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promote disarmament, as required by Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, but Washington would also hedge against political reversals in 
Russia—defined as a return of an authoritative government with 25,000 nuclear 
weapons—and the policy goal of pursuing both objectives was reflected in the 1994 
NPR.93 Perry concluded in 1995 that the 1994 NPR had successfully negotiated a balance 
between lead and hedge, rebalanced the nuclear triad, adjusted NSNF levels, and 
recommended force reductions in line with the goal of a reduced role for nuclear 
weapons.94 For Perry, the 1994 NPR had achieved the smaller, safer, and more controlled 
nuclear arsenal envisaged. The 1994 NPR examined multiple force structures and arrived 
at one that could serve as the START II force while also serving the goals of “lead and 
hedge.”  
The key force structure decisions of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review revolved 
around force level reductions. Pointing to a reduced role for nuclear weapons, Perry 
described the 1994 NPR recommended force levels as a stabilizing force structure 
following the dramatic changes in forces and programs since the end of the Cold War.95 
The 1994 NPR identified different future force structure paths, considered “significant” 
reductions, declared that the “primary concern” remained the capabilities of the former 
Soviet Union (including the possibilities of a hostile Russian government or an arms 
control process failure), and reviewed options for faster reductions.96 The official view in 
1995 regarding the 1994 NPR recommendations was that force numbers (which were still 
expected to be adjusted) reflected reduced platforms, not warheads—specifically, the 
NPR “did not change the total number of warheads the United States planned to retain 
under START II”—and “no new strategic nuclear systems are either under development 
or planned.”97 Perry argued in his 1995 Annual Report that force reductions under 
START I and START II demonstrated a reduced role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national 
93 The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, 50.  
94 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 92.  
95 The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, 40.  
96 Ibid., 10.  
97 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 87. 
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security, and he outlined major posture changes already completed by 1995, including a 
47 percent reduction in the number of deployed strategic warheads, a 90 percent 
reduction in NSNF, and a 91 percent cut in NATO stockpiles.98 Force level reductions 
were linked to the reduced role of nuclear weapons in official statements.  
The 1994 NPR reviewed the nuclear triad and how it might be rebalanced to 
better reflect the contemporary security environment. Two years before the NPR, in his 
1992 annual report, Secretary of Defense Cheney argued for a smaller arsenal (arms 
reductions) but the same basic force structure (retention of the Cold War nuclear triad), 
noting that national security requirements still called for a survivable, effective strategic 
deterrent.99 The 1998 NSS continued to endorse a nuclear triad “sufficient to deter” any 
potential adversary leaders with access to nuclear weapons and to dissuade such leaders 
from competing with the United States by convincing them that pursuing a nuclear 
advantage “would be futile.”100 The 1994 NPR did not seriously challenge the nuclear 
triad inherited from the Cold War or the deterrence role of the triad.  
The 1994 NPR reportedly considered eliminating one leg of the triad. According 
to the Washington Post, Ashton Carter, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy, wrote an option to cut the land–based leg of the nuclear 
triad. This option failed to gain support from the Secretary of Defense or key Members of 
Congress.101  
The nuclear triad had been “rebalanced,” according to Deutch’s congressional 
testimony on the 1994 NPR.102 In 1995, Perry discussed hedging against the failure of 
one leg of the triad “because of technical failure of a delivery platform or warhead, or 
technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries” as a rationale for retaining the 
nuclear triad, and he observed that the triad was still relevant to a START II–size 
98 Ibid., 86.  
99 Cheney, 1992 Annual Report, vii, 7, 62. 
100 Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 12.  
101 David B. Ottaway and Steve Coll, “Trying to Unplug the War Machine,” Washington Post, April 
12, 1995, A1. 
102 H. Hrg.: U.S. Nuclear Policy, 3. 
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force.103 Perry emphasized that the United States relied on fewer types of nuclear weapon 
systems following the 1994 NPR, which may explain what he meant by “rebalanced.” 
The 1994 NPR clearly decided that a nuclear triad of SDVs still applied to planned force 
levels.  
B. PUBLIC DEBATES 
According to Josiane Gabel, U.S. nuclear posture debates in the 1990s concerned 
the implications of post–Cold War “exigencies,” including, most importantly, the idea 
that “it was in the United States’ interest to reduce the political salience of nuclear 
weapons in international affairs” and “that lower levels of nuclear armament would make 
the United States and its allies more secure.”104 Michael Krepon asserted that, with the 
Cold War over, “nuclear overkill” and vulnerability to missile attack no longer seemed 
like valid concepts, no longer seemed credible in policy debates, and no longer seemed to 
resonate with public perceptions or congressional interests.105 Scholars and policy 
advocates responded to post–Cold War realities and considered the overall role—or 
salience—of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and international relations. The 
1994 NPR was criticized primarily for being too wedded to the status quo. Disarmament–
oriented critics argued that the changes it prescribed did not go far enough to alter the 
nuclear posture, in view of the threats of the 1990s.  
1. Nuclear Triad, Modernization, and Force Level Changes 
Debaters about the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and force structure, the nuclear 
triad, and a possible dyad, tended to fall into “retain” and “modify” camps. By one 
account the 1994 NPR did not satisfy “progressive” policy advocates who were looking 
for more significant changes to the triad since both retention of the nuclear triad and the 
103 Perry, 1995 Annual Report, 88. 
104 Gabel, “Nuclear Weapons after September 11,” 183. 
105 Michael Krepon, “Moving Away from MAD,” Survival 43, no. 2 (2001): 81. Krepon’s view 
seemed to disregard the 1998 report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States and the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. 
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“lead and hedge” strategy were considered too conservative.106 There were appeals for a 
nuclear dyad. Frank Miceli, affiliated at the time with Union College, wrote in 1995 that 
ICBMs have “no strategic value” and should be deactivated and the triad reduced to a 
dyad, predicated on improved U.S.–Russian arms control relations and the judgment that 
the United States needed to focus on countering “renegade nations and groups” with 
access to WMD.107 In 1998, General Eugene Habiger, United States Air Force, 
Commander of USSTRATCOM, was quoted as saying that all the triad legs are critical—
”All three legs of the triad bring something different and unique to the fight, and I cannot 
look anybody in the eye and say that one system is more crucial than any other”—and an 
important merit of the nuclear triad was a survivable reserve.108 A 1998 Defense Science 
Board Task Force concluded that, even at reduced force levels (below START II levels), 
a nuclear triad was “essential” for deterrence credibility and international security 
stability, and noted that, as force levels decline, the relative value of each triad leg 
increases.109 A 1999 Marine Corps Command and Staff College study of the nuclear triad 
reflected late 1990s political realities. The author recommended maintaining the nuclear 
triad but at reduced force levels because, while strategic deterrence was still a national 
security requirement, given shrinking defense spending, maintaining a complete triad was 
an inefficient use of national defense resources.110 The nuclear triad figured prominently 
in public debates, not least because of public interest in defense spending reductions 
following the end of the Cold War.  
Public debates over the 1994 NPR and U.S. nuclear force structure looked at how 
force levels were calculated and what the implications were for stockpile stewardship and 
nuclear force modernization. For some NPR critics, the Clinton administration’s 
106 Gwendolyn M. Hall, John T. Cappello, and Stephen R. Lambert, A Post–Cold War Nuclear 
Strategy Model (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, 1998), 16.  
107 Frank Miceli, “Strategic Nuclear Weapons: A Force for the Post–Cold War World,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 4 (1995): 335. 
108 Vago Muradian, “STRATCOM Considers Changes to Nuclear Triad,” Defense Daily 199, no. 1 
(1998): 1. 
109 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1998), 14. 
110 William W. Uhle Jr., The Case for Unilateral Nuclear Force Reductions (Quantico, VA: Marine 
Corps Command and Staff College, 1999), 24.  
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recommended force levels were “arbitrary” and reflected no obvious strategic logic, and 
in their view the argument supporting the recommendation of a “hedge” force against 
Russia was convoluted.111 But the actual force levels mirrored the 3,500 warheads 
allowed by START II. The 1994 NPR force structure recommendations were not 
arbitrary but entirely consistent with the planned START II force levels. By the second 
half of the 1990s, rising budgetary pressures prompted more public discussions of 
reducing strategic nuclear forces spending, even though strategic forces spending had 
dropped faster than other parts of the defense budget since 1985.112 According to a 2000 
GAO report, the Department of Energy, which managed the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program (SSP), saw its annual weapons budget fall from around $8 billion in the late 
1980s to around $4.5 billion in the late 1990s, which program officials believed was not 
enough to fulfill the SSP’s broad mandate.113 Some commentators questioned the 1994 
NPR force level recommendations but they were keyed to planned START II force goals. 
Concerns about the state of nuclear stockpiles began to surface by the end of the decade. 
Modernization was related to force levels. If the United States expected to get the same 
deterrent value out of a smaller arsenal, some analysts argued, delivery systems would 
need to be modernized (to retain or even increase their utility).  
Debates about the force level changes associated with the 1994 NPR followed 
predictable marginalist and traditionalist patterns. Marginalizers wanted to freeze in the 
relatively “low–salience” world following the end of the Cold War by changing nuclear 
posture and doctrine and reducing force levels. Michael MccGwire wrote in 1995 that the 
“real choice” was between falling back into the high–salience zone reminiscent of Cold 
War tension or actively pursuing a nuclear–weapon–free world.114 Keith Payne argued 
that the 1994 NPR reflected marginalist thinking. According to Payne, marginalists held 
111 Robert A. Manning, “The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter,” Foreign Policy 109 (1997–1998): 73. 
112 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence, 
11. 
113 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to 
Implement Stockpile Stewardship Program Effectively, by Gary L. Jones, GAO–01–48 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2000): 32. 
114 Michael MccGwire, “Eliminate or Marginalize? Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 
Brookings Review 13, no. 2 (1995): 36. 
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that nuclear weapons may exacerbate security concerns, since nuclear proliferation to 
rogue states like North Korea and Iraq might destabilize regional security or result in 
materials falling into the hands of terrorists; at the same time nuclear weapons may be 
employed to lessen security challenges by mitigating superpower rivalry and conflict.115 
Cambone and Garrity suggested that traditionalists were as interested in preserving 
legitimacy for the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence as for maintaining any specific 
force levels.116 Some analysts concluded that the most prudent nuclear force posture was 
somewhere between the more extreme marginalist and traditionalist views.117 President 
Clinton’s PDD-60 in November 1997, which followed three years after the 1994 NPR, 
seemed to systematize the 1994 NPR recommendations, and confirmed their official 
acceptance as policy. PDD-60 elaborated on many of the conclusions of the 1994 NPR 
and provided guidelines for maintaining nuclear deterrence and U.S. nuclear forces. 
PDD-60 specified that the United States “must maintain the assured response capability 
to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ against those assets a potential enemy values most,” 
endorsed planning for a range of options “to insure that the U.S. can respond to 
aggression in a manner appropriate to the provocation, rather than being left with an ‘all 
or nothing’ response,” endorsed a policy of not relying on “launch on warning,” but 
directed retention of the capability to respond promptly to any attack, and retention of 
flexible and survivable deterrent forces and related command and control.118 Public 
debates over the 1994 NPR force level changes were colored by demands for dramatic 
force reductions from arms reduction policy advocates, and demands from traditionalists 
to retain substantial parts of the Cold War posture, including the triad and a “first–use” 
policy.  
115 Keith B. Payne “The Case Against Nuclear Abolition and For Nuclear Deterrence,” Comparative 
Strategy 17, no. 1 (1998): 7–8. 
116 Cambone and Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” 78. 
117 Hall, Cappello, and Lambert, A Post–Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model, 6.  
118 “PDD/NSC 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance, November 1997,” Federation of 
American Scientists, accessed September 6, 2014, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm.  
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2. Sole Purpose, “No–First–Use,” and Negative Security Assurances  
Following the 1994 NPR, debates about the roles of nuclear weapons featured 
conflicting views on the principal threats and the utility of nuclear weapons. Some writers 
concluded that the second nuclear age was more “volatile”—in the sense of being more 
unpredictable—than the Cold War period.119 Russia and rogue states dominated 
perceptions of the threat environment in the mid-1990s—which was seen as still a 
“dangerous world”—and fueled commitment among some policy makers and analysts to 
protect investment in nuclear arsenals.120 “Sole purpose” arguments surfaced, however, 
and were related to a belief in the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons. Andrew 
Goodpaster in 1997 presented a fairly typical “sole purpose” argument. Since in his view 
the United States had no need to threaten non-nuclear–weapon states with nuclear strikes, 
Goodpaster argued that the only useful role for nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear 
threats against the U.S. population and territory, U.S. deployed forces, and particular U.S. 
allies (a narrow conception of “sole purpose”).121 Keith Payne, in making a 
counterproliferation argument, pointed out that U.S. declaratory policy never considered 
nuclear weapons useful only for deterring nuclear threats, though such a nuclear–only 
principle was popular among some policy advocates (the “sole purpose” advocates) who 
saw it as a step toward complete nuclear disarmament.122 Some arguments linked a 
narrow role for nuclear weapons (sole purpose) to lower force levels (an argument for 
possessing no more weapons than necessary for a given narrow role). According to 
William Burns, writing in 1997, a National Academy of Sciences Committee on 
International Security and Arms Control study, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Policy,” arrived at a “core mission” of countering nuclear use only and, given “the right” 
security environment, recommended a reduction to several hundred nuclear weapons to 
119 See Fred Charles Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (1996): 
119–128; and Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
120 H.N.S.C. No. 105–11: Threats to U.S. National Security, 1–2.  
121 Andrew J. Goodpaster, “The Declining Utility of Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Quarterly 20, 
no. 3 (1997): 91–95. 
122 Keith B. Payne, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, no. 1 
(2009): 44. 
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support the core mission only.123 There was no agreement on a narrow purpose or a 
wider purpose, or a sole- or multiple-purpose role for nuclear weapons after 1994. The 
1990s nuclear weapons policy debate attempted to define military utility for nuclear 
weapons in national security following the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a 
nuclear superpower and U.S. adversary.  
NPR debates in the 1990s considered the functions of nuclear weapons, and the 
declaratory policy of no–first–use, which could not be separated from proliferation 
issues. The “sole purpose” debate (and issues of a nuclear taboo) aside, nuclear weapons 
have presented a wide range of possible uses—broad utility—at least in principle. In his 
2001 study entitled Sizing Post–Cold War Nuclear Forces, I.C. Oelrich, a researcher with 
the Institute for Defense Analyses, presented four rationales for the possession of nuclear 
weapons: deterrence of attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), damage 
limitation, tactical war–fighting, and political prestige and virtual power.124 Nuclear 
proliferation had been an issue during the Cold War, but after the 1990–1991 Gulf War 
proliferation concerns reemerged and the “proliferation problem” was identified by 
analysts as a “high stakes” issue, prompting policy makers to expand counterproliferation 
efforts beginning in the George H.W. Bush administration and continuing significantly 
during the Clinton administration.125 A 1995 RAND study recommended reserving the 
option to use nuclear weapons to counter WMD threats.126 According to Robert G. 
Spulak, for proponents of maintaining robust nuclear warfare capabilities, the 1994 NPR 
appeared designed to produce a “nuclear stigma” and masked a real desire for a nuclear–
weapon–free world.127 Traditionalists focused their arguments on the inherent 
uncertainty in the international security environment, and they opposed sharp changes in 
123 William F. Burns, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Arms Control Today 27, no. 7 
(1997): 3–5. 
124 See I.C. Oelrich, Sizing Post–Cold War Nuclear Forces (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 2001), 23.  
125 Brad Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security 18, no. 1 
(1993): 139. 
126 David C. Gompert, Ken Watman, and Dean A. Wilkening, U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy: The 
Question of Nuclear First Use (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 23.  
127 See Robert G. Spulak Jr., “The Case in Favor of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Parameters 27 (Spring 
1997): 106–118.  
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policy such as a no–first–use declaration.128 Despite its arms control objectives, the 
Clinton administration did not change course on the “long–standing refusal” by U.S. 
leaders to rule out nuclear first–use.129 Public debates about the role of nuclear weapons 
in the 1994 NPR included calls by some activists and commentators for a no–first–use 
policy, but that seemed to clash with growing WMD proliferation concerns.  
Public debates about the 1994 NPR and the role of nuclear weapons seemed to pit 
those who recommended a narrow role—even a “sole purpose” approach—against those 
who were concerned about the need to deter a growing range of threats. Following the 
1995 NPT Review Conference, there was “a lot of discussion” about linking nuclear 
deterrence to non-nuclear contingencies, even though the 1994 NPR had downplayed 
targeting non-nuclear–weapon states—leading some analysts to conclude that U.S. 
declaratory policy was to be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to a wide range 
of threats.130 Cambone and Garrity concluded that the 1994 NPR advanced no important 
policy agenda and that it did not alter existing declaratory policy—specifically, it did not 
recommend that the United States adopt a no–first–use policy—and it left open the 
possibility of retaliating with nuclear means against an adversary’s use of chemical and/
or biological arsenals—a counterproliferation role for nuclear weapons.131 According to 
Joseph Pilat, by the 2000 NPT Review Conference it appeared that there was a significant 
lack of consensus among analysts and commentators on the usefulness of negative 
security assurances (NSAs) in the post–Cold War security environment.132 The 1994 
NPR considered NSAs but they did not figure notably in the policy recommendations.  
128 Cambone and Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” 78. 
129 See Andrew Butfoy, “Perpetuating U.S. Nuclear ‘First–Use’ into the Indefinite Future: Reckless 
Inertia or Pillar of World Order?” Contemporary Security Policy 23, no. 2 (2002): 149–168. 
130 Daryl G. Kimball, Janne E. Nolan, Rose Gottemoeller, and Morton H. Halperin, “Parsing the 
Nuclear Posture Review,” Arms Control Today 32, no. 2 (2002): 16. 
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3. Strategic Stability, Deterrence, and Counterproliferation 
Strategic stability debates surrounding the 1994 NPR involved arms control and 
theories of achieving deterrence stability with smaller forces. Robert A. Manning, then a 
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in 1997, in commenting on the 
low likelihood of major power conflict, that the fundamental purpose and “measure of 
virtue” of arms control was to enhance strategic stability. Because Russia was part 
partner, part potential adversary, Manning argued, nuclear weapons doctrine was a 
mixture of MAD and reassurance.133 Some lingering support for MAD with newer 
formulations of reassurance was understandable at the time, given the possibility of 
Russian political backsliding. A 1994 report to Congress, Threat Control through Arms 
Control, prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argued that arms 
control could play an essential part in U.S. national security strategy in the 1990s since 
arms control could address threats situated beyond the limits of military force. In other 
words, “Arms control is threat control.”134 The interrelation of deterrence, force 
structure, strategic stability, and arms control changed very little through the 1990s. The 
concept of central deterrence and its related force structure, driven by the need to not 
invite a first strike from Moscow, continued in arms control debates.135 Post–Cold War 
force structure analysts understood the need for more flexible deterrent options with 
lower numbers of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, and for instruments more 
deployable than the heavy “positional” U.S. Air Force and Army forces that had 
historically reinforced NATO.136 In considering deterrence stability at lower force levels, 
and the recommended 3,500 force level of the 1994 NPR, the authors of a 1998 Institute 
for National Security Studies paper argued for policy makers to engage more fully in a 
debate about the relationship between strategic stability and force numbers.137 Deterrence 
133 Manning, “The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter,” 77. 
134 See Threat Control through Arms Control: Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1994). The quote is from the “Director’s Overview” in the front matter. 
135 F.S. Nyland, Some Potential Risks at Lower Levels of Strategic Nuclear Weapon Arsenals (Idaho 
Springs, CO: Nyland Enterprises, 1998), 9.  
136 John Lehman, “U.S. Defense Policy Options: The 1990s and Beyond,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 517 (September 1991): 193. 
137 Hall, Cappello, and Lambert, A Post–Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model, 45. 
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and arms control debates following the 1994 NPR considered how strategic stability 
could be achieved in the post–Cold War security environment.  
The debates following the 1994 NPR considered new forms of deterrence. Some 
policy camps, by the end of the 1990s, had apparently recast deterrence in new forms to 
better address what was perceived as a new security environment, based partly on the 
prevailing Clinton administration policy and strategy (expressed in the 1994 NPR) of 
seeking to “lead” in arms reductions, but “hedge” against unexpected security challenges. 
According to a 2001 National Institute for Public Policy report, policy makers should 
replace their focus on weapons numbers and types with recognition of the need for 
capabilities to deter a wide range of actors under varying circumstances.138 In the late 
1990s, some analysts asked whether a smaller arsenal could still provide sufficiently 
robust deterrence, given the rise of WMD–armed rogue states and non-state actors—so–
called emerging threats—and raised concerns that the United States was making 
commitments to reduce arsenals.139 One of the significant debates during the 1990s 
concerned whether deterrence “can be, or should be, modified from its bilateral meaning 
during the Cold War to deterrence of potential proliferators presumably from the Third 
World, including the so–called ‘rogue’ states.”140 Thinking about rogue states seemed to 
push explorations of deterrence models different from those favored during the Cold 
War. A 1995 USSTRATCOM paper entitled Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence 
discussed ambiguity and deterrence, country– and leader–specific deterrence plans, and 
weaknesses of NSAs.141 This paper appeared to be an early attempt to define post–Cold 
War deterrence in a systematic manner. Post–Cold War assessments of threats by some 
commentators fueled interest in exploring new forms of deterrence in order to increase 
(or return to) high–confidence deterrence.  
138 Keith B. Payne, study director, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms 
Control, Vol. 1: Executive Report (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2001), 2, 12.  
139 Robert J. Filler, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Post Strategic Arms Reduction Talk World: Is 
There a Future for Nuclear Deterrence? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), iii, 1. 
140 Andrew J. Goodpaster and C. Richard Nelson, Post–Cold War Conflict Deterrence (Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 108.  
141 Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence, Headquarters, United States Strategic Command, 1995, 
2–3, http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/SAGessentials.PDF. 
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Proliferation and counterproliferation were prominent themes in public debates 
over the 1994 NPR. The 1994 NPR was believed by some to have diminished the 
national security profile (or role) of nuclear weapons. Hans Kristensen claimed that 
counterproliferation mission requirements development and planning continued parallel 
to the Clinton Nuclear Posture Review, and that the 1994 NPR assigned a “prominent” 
counterproliferation role to nuclear weapons in the post–Cold War security 
environment.142 Writers who were skeptical about the counterproliferation mission, 
including Hans Kristensen and Joshua Handler, argued that there was only weak evidence 
to support the use of nuclear weapons to prevent the proliferation of WMD.143 But it 
seemed that these arguments did not consider the role of dissuasion. Keith Payne argued 
that the requirements for a counterproliferation nuclear role might actually increase due 
to the failure of nonproliferation regimes.144 According to a 1994 Air War College study, 
there was a need for updated deterrence policies to account for the different motives of 
proliferators.145  
Joachim Krause wrote in 2007 that some members of the Clinton administration 
believed that they confronted three “imperatives”—controlling so–called loose nukes in 
the former Soviet Union; deterring rogue states (authoritarian regimes, openly in 
violation of NPT treaty obligations); and defining a new role for nuclear weapons that 
garnered international acceptance and preserved the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. To 
counter the rogue states challenge, the administration “had no other choice” but to 
promote counterproliferation (and it suffered some backlash from the disarmament 
community for this): “Given that North Korea, Iraq, Libya and Iran were quite 
problematic regimes, and given that the traditional instruments of technology denial were 
142 Kristensen, “Targets of Opportunity,” 24.  
143 See Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, “The USA and Counter–Proliferation: A New and 
Dubious Role for U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Security Dialogue 27, no. 4 (1996): 387–399. 
144 Keith B. Payne, “Post–Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense,” Orbis 39, no. 2 (1995): 202.  
145 See Jo Vonnie D. Cole, Beyond Stalemate: Deterrence and Nonproliferation in the New World 
Order (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1994). 
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becoming less and less effective, there was no alternative to involving the military on a 
larger scale as part of the overall non-proliferation effort.”146  
Hans Kristensen asserted that USSTRATCOM led counter–marginalization (or 
traditionalist) efforts during the 1994 NPR, and he suggested that the 1997 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) seemed to indicate that traditionalists had won some important 
policy debates within the administration by that time. Most significantly, the QDR named 
a counterproliferation role for nuclear weapons, and declared that the United States 
continued to need a flexible and survivable nuclear deterrent.147 After the completion of 
the 1994 NPR, there was an expanding policy focus on counterproliferation, rogue states 
and WMD threats. Counterproliferation (with respect to the nuclear posture and the 
NPRs) seemed to be much more of an issue with commentators (especially arms control 
and disarmament proponents) than with policy makers or NPR participants. In public 
debates, deterrence was at times equated with preventing WMD use, which effectively 
linked deterrence to counterproliferation.  
146 Joachim Krause, “Enlightenment and Nuclear Order,” International Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007): 496. 
147 Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” 7. 
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III. THE 2001 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 
Douglas Feith, then the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in testimony 
submitted during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the 2001 Nuclear 
Posture Review, on February 14, 2002, stated that “The primary purpose of the 1994 
review was to determine the strategic nuclear force structure to be deployed under the 
second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).”148 Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld explained the proposed post–Cold War nuclear force structure in his foreword 
to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report. Rumsfeld observed that there were “few 
changes” to force posture other than those required by START I, and that there were no 
significant changes to employment policy.149 The U.S. nuclear posture in the 1990s was 
characterized by the concepts of “lead and hedge,” with lower force levels and an 
emphasis on stockpile stewardship. The U.S. nuclear force posture during the 1990s 
changed primarily in size (though there were also some alert status changes for strategic 
bombers).  
A. KEY DECISIONS 
Rogue regimes and WMD proliferation figured prominently in the assessment of 
threats included in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and there was a prominent role 
for counterproliferation (a broad, multifaceted response including “strengthened 
alliances,” novel approaches to the use of military forces, and “an effective missile 
defense system”).150 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stressed new capabilities, 
approaches, and methods to deter conflict. The 2001 QDR examined “new deterrence 
tools” and improvements to extended deterrence protection of allies and partners through 
148 Douglas J. Feith, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Nuclear 
Posture Review, February 14, 2002, 1.  
149 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Foreword to Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, January 8, 2002). See file, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review.” 
150 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2002), 14. 
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“missile defenses, defensive information operations, and counter–terrorist operations.”151 
Key decisions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review were guided by the priorities of the 
New Triad, force reductions, and counterproliferation. The 2001 NPR focused on 
applying new concepts in a conscious attempt to break with Cold War era defense 
planning. One of the goals was to achieve greater flexibility, which was seen as needed 
because of international security unpredictability.  
1. Role of Nuclear Weapons 
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review recognized a broad conception of national 
security goals as well as the enduring critical value of nuclear weapons. The role of 
nuclear weapons was, however, less clear than during the Cold War. Leaked portions of 
the 2001 NPR described the function of nuclear weapons as providing “credible military 
options” to deter a wide range of potential threats, “including WMD and large–scale 
conventional military force,” given the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons in 
holding at risk adversary targets not vulnerable to non-nuclear means.152 The 2001 NPR 
outlined a broad range of roles for nuclear weapons. A way of understanding the 
relevance of nuclear weapons is to look at the national security goals that they serve. 
Keith Payne explained that nuclear weapons serve goals beyond those suggested by their 
“military characteristics,” and that deterrence, assurance, and dissuasion more clearly 
indicated the other U.S. goals of protecting allies, restricting the proliferation of WMD, 
and discouraging potential adversaries from challenging U.S. power and interests. The 
enduring use of nuclear weapons as a “withheld threat” highlighted the central role of 
nuclear weapons in national security.153 As noted above, the roles of nuclear weapons 
included assuring U.S. allies. The national security goal of assurance was essential to 
protecting U.S. global alliance frameworks, and supported a continuing role of providing 
a nuclear umbrella.154 A continuing function of nuclear weapons, especially to hedge 
151 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2001), 25. 
152 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], submitted to Congress December 31, 2001, dated January 8, 
2002, 3, http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf.  
153 H.A.S.C. No. 110–73: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 71. 
154 Ibid., 72. 
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against uncertainty concerning “existing nuclear powers,” was to serve as a visible sign 
of security commitments to U.S. allies, including those in NATO.155 The 2001 NPR 
viewed nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent, even given the changed, post–Cold War 
security environment, and as providing needed flexibility. Assuming a security context 
very different from the one that prevailed during the Cold War, the 2001 NPR asserted 
that a combination of capabilities would provide flexibility in options to deter potential 
adversaries motivated by different values and risk perceptions.156 The national security 
goals of assure, dissuade, deter, defend and defeat—expressed in the 2001 QDR—
underpinned how the 2001 NPR assessed the role of nuclear weapons.  
The 2001 NPR’s key decisions regarding the roles of nuclear weapons were 
influenced by the perception that there were more threats to address and counter than 
during the Cold War. There was a general conception that the rise of “new” threats 
required an updated deterrent strategy. Keith Payne, the primary author of the 2001 NPR, 
argued for keeping deterrence but adapting it to the most serious threats.157 In his 2002 
Annual Report, Rumsfeld explained that the 2001 NPR acknowledged “new dangers” in 
the threat environment, a “substantially” different security environment than at the time 
of the 1994 NPR; that Russia was no longer “an enemy”; that new kinds of potential 
enemy leaders were less predictable; that terrorists and rogue states were determined to 
acquire WMD; and that the “dominant strategic considerations” included surprise 
developments and the “ubiquity of uncertainty.”158 The 2001 NPR warned against 
potentially hostile states acquiring WMD capabilities. WMD–armed rogue states could 
threaten neighboring states directly through coercion and dominate regions, and threaten 
regional security indirectly by transferring WMD–related means and knowledge to 
155 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2000), 6. 
156 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 3.  
157 H.A.S.C. No. 110–73: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 11.  
158 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, 2002), 83–84. 
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terrorists.159 The threat of WMD proliferation was seen as alarming given predictions 
about the gradual increase in the number of nuclear states.160  
According to a 2008 Department of Defense document titled National Security 
and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, the 2001 NPR distinguished between 
immediate, potential, and unexpected challenges (or contingencies)—Russia was no 
longer assessed as an immediate threat—and concluded that the recommended force size 
of 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) was 
sufficient to assure allies and dissuade potential adversaries.161 The Bush administration 
and the 2001 NPR concluded that a new policy framework and defense planning 
approach were necessary to adapt nuclear policy, strategy, and force structure to a 
“rapidly changing security environment.”162 The New Triad was part of the new 
framework. In the 2001 NPR, the Bush administration conceptually reorganized the Cold 
War nuclear triad into a New Triad comprising the old nuclear triad of the Cold War 
period (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) combined with offensive conventional strike 
forces as one leg, active and passive defenses as a second leg, and a responsive defense–
industrial complex as the third leg. Responsiveness, in this case, was defined primarily as 
the ability to reconstitute a larger arsenal in a short time. The New Triad was 
controversial because arms reduction advocates charged that the Bush administration was 
trying to increase the role of nuclear weapons in national security, despite its declaratory 
policy objective to reduce the role. The 2001 NPR’s key decisions regarding the role of 
nuclear weapons represented a break in continuity in how the threats for which nuclear 
weapons are potentially used were conceived, and appeared to be shaped at least partially 
by events of September 11, 2001.  
159 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2006), 32. 
160 S. Hrg. 105–587: Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Hearing 
before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1998, 61. 
161 U.S. Department of Defense, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 14–15. ODSNW were explained in the 2001 NPR: 
“Warheads that will count as operationally deployed are: for ballistic missiles, the actual number of nuclear 
weapons loaded on the ICBMs or SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage 
areas at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares).” Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 16. 
162 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, 1.  
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The 2001 NPR examined the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving defense 
policy goals. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report described the following 
defense policy goals: to dissuade future “military competition”; to assure allies and 
partners; to deter threats; and to defeat threats if deterrence failed.163 There was a 
realization that more was needed than just an offensive deterrent force of nuclear 
weapons. According to Rumsfeld’s 2002 Annual Report, the 2001 NPR concluded that 
offensive nuclear weapons alone could not suffice to meet defense policy goals and that a 
new approach to deterrence was needed to counter “the challenges of surprise and 
uncertainty.”164 The 2005 National Defense Strategy discussed the assure, dissuade, 
deter, and defeat goals as focused on entities that threatened to harm the United States 
directly, especially “extremist enemies” with WMD, “key states” and “problem 
states.”165 This strategy document emphasized the importance of a capabilities–based 
approach to defense planning. Congressional testimony in January 2002 on the 2001 NPR 
revealed that a more flexible capabilities–based approach to defense planning included 
assessing the widest range of potential threats and adversaries.166 The 2001 NPR focused 
on potential challengers to U.S. interests or the interests of allies and partners, and 
considered dissuasion by military forces alone, including nuclear forces.167 There were 
clear and repeated attempts by Bush administration officials to link the role of nuclear 
weapons to the achievement of defense policy goals.  
2. Theory of Deterrence 
In looking at conceptions of deterrence theory around the time of the 2001 NPR, 
Bush administration officials considered traditional topics like strategic stability and 
newer topics like tailored deterrence. The 2006 National Security Strategy discussed 
163 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2001), 11. 
164 Rumsfeld, 2002 Annual Report, 84. 
165 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005), iv, 4. 
166 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 2002, 43. 
167 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 3.  
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tailored deterrence (referencing the 2006 QDR) in the context of future force capabilities 
that would effectively deter—in a tailored fashion—different threats, including non-state 
threats, and still assure allies and partners.168 In the 2002 Annual Report, Rumsfeld stated 
that the United States required an appropriate mix of capabilities to meet a broad range of 
contingencies. The 2001 NPR recommended a broad-capabilities approach—a mix of 
offensive and defensive, and nuclear and conventional assets—so that the United States 
would not have to depend solely on nuclear weapons and retaliatory threats for 
deterrence.169 The 2006 National Security Strategy captured post-9/11 strategic thinking 
and indicated the extent to which some ideas developed in the 2001 NPR were becoming 
more widely accepted in the defense community. The 2006 NSS called for new 
approaches to deterrence and defense planning, declared that U.S. deterrence was no 
longer based essentially on “grim” threats of massive retaliation, and explained that 
deterrence by denial, of both state and non-state actors, could be achieved more 
effectively by using a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities.170 Moving 
beyond MAD was apparently conceptualized in part as pursuing offensive and defensive 
capabilities to threaten an adversary with operational defeat instead of punishment.  
Tailored deterrence, which was presented at times as a new concept, emphasized 
that not all factors of the deterrence equation, including the threat to be deterred, could be 
adequately anticipated; tailored deterrence was an attempt to return deterrence to a 
solvable (or workable) formulation in the post–Cold War security environment.171 After 
recognizing that the United States would continue to face diverse threats, the 2006 QDR 
stated that the Department of Defense had begun taking steps to operationalize tailored 
168 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2006), 42. 
169 Rumsfeld, 2002 Annual Report, 84. 
170 Bush, The National Security Strategy, 22. Deterrence by denial refers to denying an adversary the 
ability to achieve its political and military objectives through aggression. See Michael S. Gerson, 
“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39 (Autumn 2009): 32–48. 
171 S. Hrg. 110–205: Nuclear and Strategic Policy Options, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the 
Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007, 55. Tailored deterrence refers to adapting 
deterrent approaches to the perceptions, beliefs, values, interests, and probable strategic calculations of 
specific adversaries. See Director, Plans and Policy, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 
Version 2.0 (Offutt AFB, NE: Strategic Command, December 2006). 
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deterrence (or “more tailorable approaches appropriate for advanced military competitors, 
regional WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks”).172 In its theory of 
deterrence, the 2001 NPR was influenced by ideas about how tailored deterrence more 
adequately addressed the post-9/11 threat environment than previous approaches to threat 
assessment and capability development.  
In considering deterrence stability, 2001 NPR participants examined nuclear 
security assurances to allies and the nonproliferation effects of extended deterrence. 
Department of Defense publications at the time established the role of nuclear weapons in 
deterring the use of WMD and in achieving more traditional goals, including extended 
deterrence (and assurance) and holding at risk targets beyond the reach of non-nuclear 
means. According to the 2002 Annual Report, the New Triad would deter WMD threats, 
assure allies, hold at risk adversary targets invulnerable to non-nuclear capabilities, and 
dissuade potential adversaries from developing nuclear and conventional capabilities that 
might threaten the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. These 
achievements would support nonproliferation goals—all at about one-third the number of 
operationally deployed warheads at that time (after planned warhead cuts were 
effective).173 Despite the concerns of some commentators, such as Daryl Kimball and 
Wolfgang Panofsky, Keith Payne argued that assurance was a necessary defense policy 
goal (given the contemporary security environment) because allies would decide whether 
they deemed themselves assured, and because there was a concomitant nonproliferation 
effect—most importantly, nuclear weapons assured allies to “a level they deem 
adequate.”174 Payne defended extended deterrence and the 2001 NPR’s support of 
nonproliferation. Credible nuclear deterrence is linked to nonproliferation, he explained, 
because assured allies would forgo possession of nuclear weapons. Payne called this 
possibly the most effective “inhibitor” of global proliferation.175 The 2001 NPR’s 
conclusion, Payne continued, that credible deterrence supported nuclear nonproliferation 
172 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, 49. 
173 Rumsfeld, 2002 Annual Report, 86. 
174 Payne, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” 56. 
175 Payne, “Setting the Record Straight,” 146. 
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(and that the goals of a credible nuclear deterrent and nonproliferation were linked and 
complementary) was therefore sound.176 The 2001 NPR’s theory of deterrence 
acknowledged the importance of allies and partners, the links between nuclear weapons 
and assurance and extended deterrence, and the ways in which pursuit of a credible 
deterrent may contribute to the achievement of nonproliferation goals.  
Key deterrence stability decisions of the 2001 NPR addressed alert status issues 
and missile defense. Leaked excerpts of the classified 2001 NPR report indicated that 
participants addressed force alert status issues and noted that U.S. forces were not on 
“hair trigger” alert.177 According to the leaked text of the 2001 NPR report, “The 
elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction 
of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper 
missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a 
necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities.”178 The issue of alert status 
came up in the primary Senate Hearing to discuss the 2001 NPR results. Loren 
Thompson of the Lexington Institute, in a 2002 Senate hearing which reviewed the 
foreign policy implications of the 2001 NPR, noted that heavy bombers have multiple 
missions and would not normally remain on strip alert loaded with nuclear weapons, that 
around 500 Minuteman ICBMs would remain on alert, and that 8 SSBNs would typically 
remain at sea.179 Concerning missile defense of U.S. territory and U.S. forces deployed 
outside the United States, the 2001 NPR concluded that deterrence credibility, including 
the credibility of extended deterrence, would be served by effective missile defense 
coupled with the ability to create certainty in the minds of adversary leaders as to U.S. 
capabilities to effectively retaliate with strikes.180 The combination of defensive means 
and offensive strike capabilities might improve U.S. calculations about the risks and 
176 Ibid. 
177 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 17. 
178 Ibid. 
179 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 54. According to a critic of the 2001 
NPR and long–standing U.S. policy, Joseph Cirincione, “The review advocates maintaining a substantial 
force of high–alert nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. This encourages other nations, particularly 
Russia, to maintain or construct larger forces than they otherwise would.” Ibid., 48. 
180 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 4. 
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stakes in regional conflicts. Loren Thompson testified in Senate Hearing 107–677 that the 
majority of heavy bombers would be tasked “primarily” with conventional missions and 
that “many” SSBNs would remain in port.181 Bush administration officials testified about 
reduced alert status in congressional hearings on the 2001 NPR.  
3. Force Structure 
Key force structure decisions of the 2001 NPR aimed to increase defense planning 
flexibility while reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons systems. The 2001 NPR arrived at the following force levels and force structure, 
to be achieved by 2012: an operationally deployed force of 1,700–2,200 strategic nuclear 
warheads; 14 Trident SSBNs (with two of the 14 in overhaul at any time), 500 
Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H heavy bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers.182 The 2001 
NPR specified that the goal of an operationally deployed force including 1,700–2,200 
warheads by 2012 was keyed to assessments of immediate and unexpected contingencies 
(or a “surprise development”).183 This was practically the same as the hedge force of the 
1994 NPR. The 2001 NPR identified an inactive stockpile, the size of which would 
depend at least partially on the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex (supervised by 
the National Nuclear Security Administration) to refurbish and dismantle weapons: 
between approximately 350 and 600 weapons per year, given funding of an NNSA–
proposed plan.184  
Force sizing after the 2001 NPR was not an exact procedure. Sidney Drell, then a 
Hoover Institution Senior Fellow and Professor Emeritus at Stanford University’s Linear 
Accelerator Center, testified in 2007 that the size and scope of the modernized nuclear 
weapon infrastructure could not be effectively determined because of a lack of long-term 
policy guidance about nuclear weapon roles and missions; total warhead numbers could 
181 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 41. 
182 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 6. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 10. 
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be around 5,000 (the level at that time) down to about 500.185 According to NPR 
participants, the 2001 NPR force levels were meant to improve global security, preserve 
deterrence stability while completing “huge reductions” in U.S. and Russian arsenals, 
reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence by acquiring offensive and defensive conventional 
capabilities for coping with accident-prone or irrational adversaries, and provide 
expanded response options for future strategic leaders.186 The Bush administration 
pursued reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads through arms 
control with Russia while relying on the ability of the nuclear weapon infrastructure to 
successfully maintain reserve warheads as a hedge force.  
Force structure decisions of the 2001 NPR focused on cutting operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and implementing the New Triad while maintaining 
defense planning flexibility. The 2001 NPR anticipated an operationally deployed force 
size of 3,800 warheads by the end of fiscal year 2007 (a 40 percent reduction in the 
number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads at the time of the NPR) but 
observed that force structure would be mainly preserved: “The drawdown of the 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure in that, 
aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no additional strategic 
delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service.”187 The aim 
appeared to be to draw down operationally deployed force levels without losing 
significant capabilities in addition to the Peacekeeper ICBMs and the four Trident 
SSBNs. Looking beyond 2012, the 2001 NPR recommended long-term planning studies 
to examine options for fully realizing the potential of nuclear forces in the New Triad.188 
Recommended force levels for operationally deployed systems were defined in order to 
preserve flexibility, protect the ability to reconstitute, and adapt to varied security 
developments. In order to achieve the defense policy goals of “dissuading potential 
adversaries, assuring allies, deterring aggression, and defeating enemies,” the United 
185 S. Hrg. 110–205: Nuclear and Strategic Policy Options, 63. 
186 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 43–44. 
187 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 16. 
188 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, February 2003, 22. 
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States would need to retain a responsive nuclear weapons capability.189 Brian R. Green, 
then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testified in 2007 about the progress in 
implementing the 2001 NPR recommendations. Green said that the Bush administration 
was on track to achieve the level of 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads by 2012, that the last Peacekeeper ICBMs had been retired, and that there were 
plans for the Department of Defense to cut 50 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs and 38 B-
52 heavy bombers (as scheduled).190 The 2001 NPR had the challenge of adjusting force 
levels without excessively cutting strategic capabilities, given the focus on 
unpredictability and the need for deterrence reliability. The 2002 Moscow Treaty level of 
1,700–2,200 warheads referred specifically to operationally deployed warheads “mated to 
deployed delivery vehicles or in storage areas at bomber bases,” but it did not include 
logistics spares.191  
Key force structure decisions of the 2001 NPR related to the New Triad touched 
on issues of defense planning flexibility, pursuit and protection of key defense 
capabilities, and reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. To 
realize the suite of programs that together made up the New Triad and to reach the 1,700–
2,200 force level for 2012, the Department of Defense acknowledged that it would need 
to plan, assess, and develop elements of the New Triad over time through systematic 
processes coordinated with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
process.192 In 2002 Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander in Chief, United States Strategic 
Command, testified in a prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
189 Feith, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9. According to Feith, the United 
States should retain a responsive nuclear weapons capability to give the option to adjust the number of 
operationally deployed nuclear weapons should the international security environment change. Ibid.  
190 S. Hrg. 110–201, Pt. 7: Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2008, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 
2007, 61.  
191 “Strategic Offensive Forces and the Nuclear Posture Review’s ‘New Triad,’” National Institute for 
Public Policy, March 2003, 13.  
192 Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, 25. The term PPBS refers to the Department of 
Defense’s formalized multi–year resource management process. For more, see Milton L. Tulkoff, C. Vance 
Gordon, Rachel D. Dubin, and Wade P. Hinkle, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS)/Multi-year Programming Reading Guide (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010). 
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the advantages of the completed New Triad would include “improved strategic strike 
forces, active and passive defenses, and a responsive infrastructure all supported by 
improved command and control as well as robust intelligence and planning 
capabilities.”193 “This New Triad,” Ellis continued, “can broaden the definition of 
strategic forces, enhance deterrence concepts against a wider range of threats and offer 
dramatic improvements in the speed, accuracy and agility of the full range of our nation’s 
military response.”194  
The Bush administration used the 2001 NPR to conceive broad, comprehensive 
defense changes of which the New Triad was probably the most significant. The New 
Triad, as a diverse array of options for countering a broad array of “possible 
contingencies,” was a result of the Department of Defense applying the capabilities-based 
approach to nuclear forces.195 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 2002 Annual 
Report described the 2001 NPR as a “blueprint for transforming our strategic posture” 
and stated that it represented “a major departure in our approach for managing strategic 
issues.”196 Transformation of the U.S. nuclear posture was meant to complement 
transformation of conventional forces for a new understanding of the security 
environment, which participants in the 2001 NPR recognized was substantially different 
from that of the early 1990s. There was a recognition that Cold War deterrence models 
and expectations would not apply to all potential post–Cold War adversaries or threat 
circumstances. In 2006, however, uneven progress was reported on achieving all aspects 
of New Triad as spelled out in 2001 NPR: “The only robust capability in the New Triad 
is the Old Triad—the legacy nuclear forces of land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, and 
193 Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command 
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Nuclear Posture Review, February 14, 2002, 7. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Rumsfeld, 2002 Annual Report, 85.  
196 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, 2002), 83–84. Ch. 7, “Adapting U.S. Strategic Forces,” discussed the New 
Triad. 
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strategic bombers.”197 The 2001 NPR’s New Triad was extremely ambitious in its goals 
but only moderately realized in practice.  
B. PUBLIC DEBATES 
Brian R. Green argued, in his prepared statement before Congress in 2007, 
referring to the 2001 NPR results, that the New Triad was designed to reduce U.S. 
dependence on nuclear weapons, and to provide a suite of capabilities to address “new 
security risks.” In Green’s words, “nuclear capabilities possess unique properties and 
provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD 
use.”198 By 2001, scholars like Robert G. Joseph of National Defense University were 
arguing that defenses, such as ballistic missile defenses, were increasingly relevant to 
strategic deterrence and that the United States would need to be “realistic” about the role 
that arms control could play in maintaining strategic stability (in other words, arms 
control should not be allowed to undermine credible deterrence).199 The public debates 
that followed the 2001 NPR were at times intense and contentious. Critics were 
influenced by widespread and inaccurate impressions that the Bush administration was 
expanding the role of nuclear weapons, threatening strategic stability, and undermining 
arms control efforts. The 2001 NPR prompted numerous debates, but some of the 
debaters conflated the policy recommendations of the 2001 NPR and other foreign and 
defense policies of the George W. Bush administration.  
1. New Nuclear Weapon Capabilities, Utility, and Nuclear Use 
Some public debates about the role of nuclear weapons in the 2001 NPR stemmed 
from issues and concerns about proliferation, nuclear terrorism, so-called “new” threats, 
and whether the United States needed to build new or modified nuclear weapons.  
197 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities 
Report Summary (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, 2006), 14. 
198 S. Hrg. 110–201, Pt. 7: Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2008, 60–61. 
199 Robert G. Joseph, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Deterrence Policy,” in Deterrence in the 
21st Century, ed. Max G. Manwaring (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 59. 
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For example, Senator Russell Feingold argued before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations that low-yield warheads (called “mini-nukes” by some 2001 NPR critics) 
would be more likely to be used than higher-yield weapons. In Feingold’s view, the 
development of low-yield warheads could launch a new arms race as other states might 
perceive a need to match U.S. capabilities.200  
Some commentators drew a connection between preemption and low-yield 
warheads. The George W. Bush administration never officially articulated such a 
connection, but critics attributed such a policy to the administration. Some critics 
reasoned that use of low-yield nuclear weapons would be more controllable than that of 
higher-yield weapons and that low-yield nuclear weapons could be used against highly 
protected terrorist cells with almost none of the consequences that characterized the use 
of traditional nuclear weapons. According to Andrei Kokoshin, based in part on 
information revealed in the early 2002 leaks, the authors of the 2001 NPR favored the 
development of low-yield nuclear weapons and maintained that such weapons would not 
signify a reduction of the “nuclear threshold.”201  
According to James Doyle, then a political scientist and nonproliferation scholar 
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the 2001 NPR was not focused on denying terrorists 
access to weapons and materials but on the roles and types of nuclear weapons needed to 
effectively influence the leaders of states determined to be hostile to the United States. 
Doyle claimed that elements of the 2001 NPR led to questions about U.S. 
nonproliferation commitments. Some states perceived U.S. policy as a “repudiation” of 
the Thirteen Practical Steps on disarmament, and some states questioned the U.S. 
commitment to NPT obligations as a nuclear-weapon state.202  
200 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 4. 
201 Andrei Kokoshin, “A Nuclear Response to Nuclear Terror: Reflections of Nuclear Preemption,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607 (September 2006): 62.  
202 James Doyle, “Strategy for a New Nuclear Age,” Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 1 (2006): 96, 
103, and 105. The Thirteen Practical Steps for disarmament and nonproliferation were developed during 
the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences and agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference but the 
United States afterward withdrew support for all steps. There were disagreements over the legally binding 
character of certain measures involved in the thirteen steps. 
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In 2009, the tactical challenges of employing nuclear weapons against terrorist 
groups were examined by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the request of the 
Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management. The CTC 
researchers observed that the enhanced nuclear posture would increase the costs 
associated with organization or mission failures. For example, the CTC researchers 
argued that forward deploying nuclear weapons in theater would risk their inadvertent 
transfer to terrorists, and U.S. leaders would risk “reputational damage” if airplanes 
carrying nuclear weapons were shot down or crashed in a population center.203 Such 
observations were not original or particularly useful since these risks had been well 
known since the 1950s. The 2001 NPR addressed the deterrence of terrorists but did not 
clearly associate nuclear capabilities with that deterrence objective: “Terrorists or rogue 
states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America’s security 
commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to 
assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve.”204 Debates were sparked by the 2001 NPR’s 
reference to new requirements: “Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in 
flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high 
accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of 
WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD 
capabilities.”205  
Public debates regarding the 2001 NPR and the utility of nuclear weapons in 
national security included the concerns of some commentators about proliferation and 
potentially overvaluing the utility of nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR built on aspects of 
the 1994, NPR including a desire to rely less on the deployed and non-deployed nuclear 
arsenal. Bush administration officials aimed to rely more, over time, on a “responsive 
nuclear weapons design” and production infrastructure in order “to manage risk” and rely 
203 Scott Helfstein, Michael J. Meese, Don Rassler, Reid Sawyer, Troy Schnack, Mathew Sheiffer, 
Scott Silverstone, and Scott Taylor, “White Paper Prepared for the Secretary of Defense Task Force on 
DOD Nuclear Weapons Management: Tradeoffs and Paradoxes: Terrorism, Deterrence and Nuclear 
Weapons,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (2009): 793. 
204 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 2. 
205 Ibid., 15. 
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less on non-deployed warheads.206 But some commentators, including Rose 
Gottemoeller, concluded that the 2001 NPR “places too much emphasis on the utility of 
nuclear weapons in U.S. military doctrine and strategy. That, in my view, is the most 
negative aspect of the review, and it in fact reveals the underlying meaning of the hedge 
strategy: nuclear weapons are important for a whole host of reasons, and we have to keep 
them around on that account.”207 In contrast, Thomas Scheber concluded that deterrence 
and related strategic stability were no longer achievable using Cold War thinking, and 
that the emerging portfolio of strategic capabilities advocated by the 2001 NPR would 
more effectively assure allies, deter the “most severe threats,” and meet extended 
deterrence commitments.208  
In 2008, Joseph Cirincione claimed that the 2001 NPR had failed to stem growing 
proliferation problems inherited by the Bush administration, and asserted that the world 
suffered “greater nuclear insecurity than during the 1990s” because there were more 
states pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities.209  
Secretary Rumsfeld and others who took part in the 2001 NPR held that they were 
reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. However, according to Grotto and 
Cirincione, other countries, including Russia, concluded the “precise opposite” from the 
leaked portions of the 2001 NPR.210 Grotto’s and Cirincione’s interpretation of Russia’s 
declared position seemed to overlook the possibility that it might have been designed to 
achieve certain political effects, such as weakening the credibility and stature of the 
George W. Bush administration. Joseph Cirincione testified that the 2001 NPR would 
seriously hamper U.S. nonproliferation goals because it would signal rejection of good-
206 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, i.  
207 Kimball et al., “Parsing the Nuclear Posture Review,” 17.  
208 Thomas Scheber, “Strategic Stability: Time for a Reality Check,” International Journal 63, no. 4 
(2008): 914. 
209 Joseph Cirincione, “Prospects for Change in U.S. Nuclear Policy,” in Nuclear Doctrines and 
Strategies, eds., M. Fitzpatrick, A. Nikitin, and S. Oznobishchev (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 
2008), 31.  
210 Grotto and Cirincione wrote: “Senior participants in the 2001 NPR genuinely believed they 
reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.” Grotto and Cirincione, Orienting 
the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, 26.  
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faith negotiations, prompting other states to reexamine their nonproliferation treaty 
commitments.211 As Grotto’s and Cirincione’s remarks suggest, there were sharply 
divergent views about how the 2001 NPR recommendations influenced perceptions about 
the utility of nuclear weapons in national security. Despite the 2001 NPR’s call for a 
decreased reliance on nuclear weapons, the debates included warnings that an increased 
emphasis on the utility of nuclear weapons would weaken America’s ability to pursue 
other national policy goals.  
The 2001 NPR prompted important public debates over what some commentators 
saw as the mixing of conventional and nuclear roles, which touched on the issues of new 
nuclear weapons and changes in the likelihood of nuclear use. Cirincione argued that 
increased integration of conventional and nuclear force planning, including linking 
intelligence, communication and operational planning for nuclear and conventional 
operations, would allow conventional forces to more easily conduct operations previously 
limited to nuclear systems, making the use of nuclear weapons less likely, but that the 
reverse was also possible, making it easier to target and use nuclear weapons in missions 
previously reserved for conventional forces.212 Payne pointed out that the “integration of 
nuclear and non-nuclear threat options” was not the same as giving what were previously 
conventional force missions to nuclear forces.213  
For some commentators the 2001 NPR recognized a need for more deterrent 
options and recommended posture and force structure changes that undermined its own 
prospects. Ellen O. Tauscher held that the New Triad, which was designed to reduce U.S. 
reliance on nuclear weapons, undercut that goal by endorsing new nuclear weapons types 
and confused debates by seemingly advocating a form of preemption.214 She concluded: 
“The Bush Administration has opposed arms control treaties, rejected the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiated an open-ended Moscow Treaty which allows for 
reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, but it does not achieve those with any 
211 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 45. 
212 Ibid., 52. 
213 Payne, “Deterrence for a New Age,” 416. 
214 H.A.S.C. No. 110–73: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 2.  
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significant reductions.”215 During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee review of the 
2001 NPR, Senator Joseph R. Biden expressed concern that the review’s 
recommendations seemed to signal an openness to new nuclear testing which might 
“unravel” the NPT regime. In his view, the pursuit of certain types of “new weapons” 
could increase the likelihood of nuclear war.216  
The “real paradox inherent in the NPR,” James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz 
concluded, was that it fundamentally reflected the nuclear non-use norm; the 2001 NPR 
represented the Bush administration’s search for options to deter and defeat WMD-armed 
adversaries using force levels far short of all-out nuclear attack.217 Commentators 
disagreed about how the probability of nuclear use might change given fulfillment of the 
Bush administration’s policy recommendations.  
2. Alert Levels, Force Reductions, and the New Triad 
Public debates about the force levels associated with the 2001 NPR included 
questions about whether dissuasion would work and arguments about what changes 
should be made to the status of force alerts. Keith Payne judged that force structure and 
force levels should be the product of a number of factors, including the volatility of the 
threat environment; the correlation between nuclear arsenals and other national policy 
goals, like nonproliferation; the goals that nuclear arsenals are meant “to serve and their 
priorities, including assurance and deterrence”; the impact of nonmilitary and non-
nuclear means on achievement of those goals; and “budget and technical realities.”218 As 
analysts considered the transition from Cold War to post–Cold War nuclear defense 
planning, there were questions about whether potential adversaries could be deterred with 
nuclear weapons. For Mackubin Owens, the 2001 NPR tried to address the threat with 
low-yield nuclear weapons capable of deep-earth penetration, based on an assumption 
that existing nuclear weapons were “too powerful” for use against adversaries armed with 
215 Ibid.  
216 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 1–2. 
217 James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, “United States Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty–first 
Century,” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 1 (2004): 106. 
218 Payne, “Setting the Record Straight,” 64. 
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WMD.219 In fact, the 2001 NPR prescribed the pursuit of an array of nuclear and non-
nuclear capabilities to counter such threats. 
Alert levels were an issue for some nuclear policy experts in congressional 
hearings. Sidney Drell, in discussing an agenda for START follow-on negotiations, 
recommended that deployed nuclear forces be taken off “prompt launch procedures” to 
reduce the possibility of nuclear use based on faulty threat information, accident, or 
“unauthorized action.”220 The purpose would be to expand response time and reduce the 
number of operationally deployed nuclear weapon systems set to launch promptly, and 
this could be achieved by various means, including separating warheads from strategic 
delivery systems, or shifting to a reliance on long-range bombers instead of nuclear-
armed ballistic missiles.221 Richard Sokolsky and Elaine Bunn questioned if unilaterally 
reducing the alert levels of U.S. nuclear weapons would increase stability, considering 
that in a crisis situation, re-alerting forces could be destabilizing and strengthen 
incentives for escalation.222 Public debates included alert levels and their connection to 
strategic stability, but in some ways the force numbers debate was overshadowed by 
other issues, including research and development on new offensive and defensive 
capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear.  
The 2001 NPR public debates regarding force composition and force level 
changes focused on force cuts. Payne observed that the 2001 NPR was based on a 
broader set of defense policy goals than was Cold War–era deterrence, and the increase in 
the number of goals explained the high numbers of proposed weapons, compared to 
projected force levels under 1990s planning assumptions and arms control agreements.223 
Steven Weinberg, a 1979 Nobel Prize winner in Physics, in official testimony submitted 
219 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order,” Orbis 
50, no. 2 (2006): 321. 
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to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, declared bluntly that planning for the use 
of nuclear weapons would frustrate attempts to reduce actual warhead numbers.224  
Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay asserted that the Bush administration cuts were 
not substantial enough and were not indicative of new strategic thinking suggested in 
official pronouncements; they claimed that the Bush administration’s plans for force 
reductions were consistent with Cold War thinking.225 Despite such claims by critics, 
there were plans to dramatically reduce force levels following the 2001 NPR. According 
to David Yost, the goal of 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
by 2012 represented close to a two-thirds drop; plans were made for real and significant 
stockpile cuts, including the May 2004 approval by President Bush of a 50 percent force 
cut from 2001 levels by 2012; and there were sizable ICBM reductions and reductions in 
the number of B-52 bomber-delivered advanced cruise missiles.226 The Bush 
administration force cut proposals were controversial, but the cuts were real.  
The New Triad of the 2001 NPR figured prominently in public debates. Keir 
Lieber and Daryl Press asserted in a 2006 Foreign Affairs article that the United States 
was achieving what they called “nuclear primacy.” For Lieber and Press, nuclear hawks 
welcomed U.S. nuclear primacy, nuclear doves worried that the United States might see 
more opportunities for coercion of other states, and nuclear owls were concerned that 
U.S. nuclear primacy might be destabilizing regardless of particular U.S. decisions and 
actions.227 According to a United States Army War College study, the most important 
and controversial element of the 2001 NPR New Triad was the mixing of non-nuclear 
strike weapons with existing nuclear offensive weapons capabilities, but the New Triad 
224 S. Hrg. 107–677: Examining the Nuclear Posture Review, 35.  
225 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons,” Policy Brief, no. 94 
(Washington, DC, Brookings Institute, 2002), 6. 
226 David S. Yost, “Analysing International Nuclear Order,” International Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007): 
569. 
227 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 
(2006): 53. 
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also envisioned the integration of missile defenses (and other forms of defense), and the 
promotion of a “responsive” nuclear weapons infrastructure.228  
Robert Pape also argued that aspects of the New Triad could be destabilizing. He 
wrote that it was seriously considered by some of the major powers that the U.S. 
development of sophisticated radars and advanced command and control systems 
designed to counter a small attack by a rogue state could be easily transformed into the 
ability to counter a large attack by a major power—meaning unequivocal U.S. nuclear 
superiority.229 Controversy over the 2001 NPR’s force structure recommendations 
focused on the New Triad.  
3. Deterrence Confidence, New Concepts, and Arms Control 
There were public debates about the 2001 NPR’s theory of deterrence related to 
deterrence confidence and reliability. Payne seemed to suggest that the 2001 NPR 
recommendations flowed from concerns about deterrence reliability and the credibility of 
Cold War-related force structure for certain deterrence contingencies or, to use his words, 
“for some contemporary deterrence purposes.”230 A 2008 Secretary of Defense Task 
Force report stated that the 2001 NPR had “reasserted the critical role nuclear weapons 
continue to play in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies, and friends by 
deterring attack and dissuading potential adversaries from undertaking hostile 
actions.”231  
The New Triad was an element of the overall U.S. policy of tailored deterrence. 
For Robert K. Uemura, the Bush administration’s focus on tailored deterrence expressed 
“the same logic” as Cold War deterrence, except that it aimed to expand the “deterrent 
audience” to include near-peer military competitors, regional WMD states, and non-state 
228 Owens, The Promise and Peril, 7. 
229 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 
(2005): 34.  
230 Payne, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” 74. 
231 Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Report of the Secretary 
of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DOD Nuclear 
Mission (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 5.  
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terrorist networks, and the focus was less on “deterrent relationships” than on acquiring 
offensive capabilities to attack and destroy the valued targets of U.S. adversaries “since a 
relationship presumes both sides recognize the consequences of acting.”232 Uemura 
observed that addressing future threats may require more than just deterrence, and 
deterrence might require more than just nuclear threats.233  
Michael Levi, a physicist and policy fellow at the Brookings Institution in 2004, 
argued that deterrence might become an especially valuable tool in the war on terror 
because a successful deterrent strategy relies on making retaliatory action appear certain 
and provides as little room as possible for the adversary to gamble that it might survive 
transferring nuclear weapons to another group.234 Edwin T. Parks, in a 2002 National 
War College study, asserted that the 2001 NPR reflected the same Cold War posture and 
strategy for deterring major state actors, such as Russia and China, shrank force structure 
but retained counterforce employment policy, and failed to articulate the kinds of 
weapons and policies needed to support the stated aim of preemptively neutralizing a 
hostile WMD attack or program. In other words, Parks held that the 2001 NPR 
undermined its own strategy by not clearly establishing promised threat responses.235 
What Bush administration officials and other 2001 NPR proponents called strengthening 
the credibility of the U.S. deterrence posture, critics called dangerously lowering the 
nuclear threshold.  
Public debates over the 2001 NPR’s theory of deterrence revolved around new 
deterrence concepts. Delpech wrote that contemporary U.S. policy makers appreciated 
the influence of regional security dynamics and reflected an understanding of who needed 
to be deterred. She added that while some theorists in an earlier era conceived of 
opponents as abstract game theory actors, current policy makers understood the need to 
232 Robert K. Uemura, Formula for Deterrence: The Challenges of Deterring Contemporary Threats 
to United States National Interests (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 2008), 31.  
233 Ibid. 
234 Michael A. Levi, “Deterring Nuclear Terrorism,” Issues in Science and Technology 20, no. 3 
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fully understand regional issues and to assess potential opponents in order to make 
effective policy. Delpech wrote that “Kahn showed little interest in game theory.”236  
The idea of “new” deterrence approaches, even if not strictly speaking new, was 
related to the realization that not all deterrence is stable. The post-9/11 period saw the 
preparation of numerous wide-ranging studies of deterrence policies and strategies aimed 
at preventing terrorist use of nuclear weapons against the United States and U.S. allies 
and interests. Paul Telleen focused on Al Qaeda in his 2008 American University 
dissertation. Al Qaeda’s idiosyncratic rationality, non-state makeup, and deep motivation 
made it appear invulnerable to deterrence concepts relying on threats of punishment. 
Telleen concluded, however, that deterrence actually applies partially to Al Qaeda, 
notably in reference to deterrence by denial. In other words, deterrence against such a 
non-state entity might be only partially successful and for only a limited period.237  
Given the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, Elbridge Colby 
urged that it was unrealistic to launch a “quixotic” campaign for the complete eradication 
of nuclear weapons. In his view, deterrence policy offers a “way forward” as a workable 
approach because of its continuing effectiveness when properly tailored. For Colby, 
deterrence had not slipped into permanent irrelevance, but remained the best possible 
strategy, if tailored and backed by real capabilities and will.238 Regarding the 2001 NPR 
recommendations and the New Triad, nuclear weapons have unique characteristics that 
allow them to effectively support flexible deterrence strategy. For Sherry Stearns-Boles, a 
new deterrence doctrine was applicable to varied threats based on tailored approaches—
tailored to specific adversaries and their cultural characteristics. Tailored deterrence was 
the new deterrence approach required for the post-9/11 world made up of multiple 
adversaries and varied threat scenarios.239 Tailored deterrence found new salience 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Whether the 2001 NPR supported or undermined 
236 Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 49. 
237 See Paul C. Telleen, “Deterrence and Nuclear Terrorism” (PhD diss., American University, 2008). 
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U.S. compliance with NPT obligations was contested. Criticism of U.S. nuclear policy 
under the Bush administration as supposedly lacking in respect for the U.S. commitment 
to the NPT was widespread in the disarmament community. 
The 2001 NPR public debates over the appropriate theory of deterrence included 
the controversial topic of Bush administration arms control policy. Mark Bromley argued 
in 2002 that the 2001 NPR would undermine the NPT by spurning irreversible arms 
reductions, proposing new nuclear weapons, and targeting non-nuclear weapon states, 
and that the United States was “turning its back” on binding arms control agreements.240 
The 2001 National Institute for Public Policy report entitled Rationale and Requirements 
for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control seemed to present the Bush administration 
position on moving away from certain binding arms control agreements, linked new 
deterrence concepts with a new approach to arms control, and declared that “strategy for 
the future should focus on close consultation, coordination, and transparency.”241  
C. Dale Walton and Colin S. Gray pointed out that strategic nuclear force level 
parity between the United States and Russia, the concept underlying the START I and 
START II arms control agreements, survived the Cold War. Some officials in the Bush 
administration intended to break the Cold War pattern, but were not successful with the 
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also called the Moscow Treaty).242  
Regarding proliferation and nonproliferation, Robert Kerrey and William Hartung 
argued that the Bush administration should seriously consider whether the U.S. nuclear 
posture should include what they regarded as a costly and still unproven missile defense 
program that could potentially upset U.S.–Russian arms reduction negotiations and spur 
China to expand its nuclear forces.243  
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There were genuine concerns in some analytical quarters that the 2001 NPR 
recommendations would be destabilizing and wreck earlier arms control agreements that 
were seen as successful by some commentators. In retrospect, these concerns appear to 
have been misplaced and exaggerated. At least some of these concerns may have been 
due to (a) how the 2001 NPR recommendations became known to public debaters 
(incomplete reports on the secret document followed by selected leaks to print media) 
and (b) how the Bush administration chose to follow up on the 2001 NPR.  
  
 65 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 66 
IV. THE 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 
Amy Woolf, a nuclear weapons policy specialist, in a 2007 article on Congress 
and nuclear weapons policies and programs, outlined post-2001 NPR debates regarding 
nonproliferation. According to Woolf, after the 2001 NPR, Congress attempted to more 
effectively align nuclear weapons programs and nonproliferation goals but some experts 
argued that nuclear weapons programs would reinforce nonproliferation goals by 
providing deterrence capabilities, while others argued that they would weaken the pursuit 
of nonproliferation goals by enhancing the perceived utility of nuclear weapons and 
making it harder to “discourage” other states from pursuing them.244 In 2009, Tom Sauer 
argued that the United States was set to achieve nuclear primacy because of the 
deteriorating state of the Russian arsenal, U.S. nuclear weapons modernization, and U.S. 
missile defenses.245  
The 2001 NPR attempted to move the U.S. nuclear posture away from Cold War 
models and planning assumptions. Its changes to deterrence conceptions were gradual. 
The U.S. nuclear posture in the 2000s was characterized by the implementation of the 
New Triad (including re-rationalization of nuclear warheads, SDVs, and nuclear complex 
modernization), the pursuit of BMD, and nuclear force reductions. The George W. Bush 
administration cut the U.S. nuclear stockpile nearly in half by 2007. The highly 
anticipated 2010 NPR followed the Bush administration’s somewhat more controversial 
2001 NPR.  
A. KEY DECISIONS 
A June 2013 White House Fact Sheet revealed that President Obama had directed 
an interagency study of nuclear deterrence policy and requirements. The significance of 
the 2013 policy guidance was that it followed the 2010 NPR and ratification of the New 
START Treaty, and that it directed the Department of Defense, the Department of State, 
244 Woolf, “Congress and U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” 510.  
245 Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post–Existential 
Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 5 (2009): 748.  
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the Department of Energy, and the broader intelligence community to carefully assess 
deterrence policy and requirements to ensure that the U.S. nuclear posture and plans 
would address the current security environment based on the idea that informed 
presidential guidance would “drive” nuclear employment policy, planning, posture 
decisions, and force structure.246  
The 2010 NPR featured a new, less ambiguous negative security assurance 
(NSA). Gary Samore, then the White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism, explained in April 2010 that the 2010 
NPR was meant to support President Obama’s “commitment to disarmament and 
nonproliferation,” to emphasize that extended deterrence was still important, and to 
exclude countries like North Korea and Iran, which threaten U.S. allies and partners, 
from the new, carefully formulated NSA.247 Obama administration officials emphasized 
that the revised NSA served to assure allies and that this served nonproliferation goals. 
The 2010 NPR was tied to the conclusion of the New START Treaty that limited—
according to its counting rules—U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to levels much lower 
than those provided for in the 1991 START Treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty. As with 
the two previous NPRs, the authors of the 2010 NPR said that it would reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, and maintain deterrence and strategic 
stability at lower force levels. Among the key decisions of the 2010 NPR, the report 
called for a major adjustment to the prioritization of ends (elevating the struggle against 
terrorism above more traditional deterrence goals), and reaffirmed the goals of reducing 
the roles of nuclear weapons and pursuing nuclear arms control and disarmament.  
1. Role of Nuclear Weapons  
The 2010 NPR changed the priority of threats and connected nuclear deterrent 
capabilities to other policies such as threat reduction, extended deterrence, and 
nonproliferation. According to the 2010 NPR report, “The threat of global nuclear war 
246 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment 
Strategy of the United States,” June 19, 2013.  
247 Gary Samore, remarks at “International Perspectives on the Nuclear Posture Review,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 22, 2010.  
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has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.”248 The statement by 
Andrew Weber, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a hearing 
on nuclear forces and policies, concluded that despite the changed nature of post–Cold 
War nuclear threats and the need to manage the nuclear terrorist threat, the United States 
needed to continue fielding strategic deterrent capabilities and maintain an “agile and 
responsive” nuclear weapons infrastructure, as well as continue threat reduction and 
nonproliferation activities.249  
In the same Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, on April 17, 2013, Major 
General Garrett Harencak, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
Integration, testified that contemporary deterrence was not one-size-fits-all. He argued 
that to effectively deter near-peer and other nuclear-armed states would require “new 
thinking and tailored application,” and that the “non-peer case may be the most 
challenging, and will require a renewed understanding of what motivates these actors as 
well as critical thinking on how best to address the threats they pose.”250 The 2010 NPR 
report specified that nuclear terrorism was the “most immediate and extreme threat” and 
that nuclear proliferation was “pressing” and demanded immediate action, given the 
prospect of certain states acquiring nuclear weapons which oppose the United States, its 
allies and partners, and the “broader international community.”251 Senator Jeff Sessions, 
in the April 17, 2013 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Nuclear Forces and Policies, 
expressed concern that allies may question U.S. commitments to use nuclear weapons in 
their defense, and stated that neglect of nuclear modernization is something allies observe 
with concern.252 President Obama’s statement on release of the NPR report signaled that 
248 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2010), 3. 
249 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Nuclear Forces and Policies in Review of the Defense 
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing Before the 
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 113th Cong., 1st 
sess., 2013, 23. 
250 Ibid., 36. 
251 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 3. 
252 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Nuclear Forces and Policies in Review of the Defense 
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014, 3. 
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preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism had moved to “the top” of the U.S. 
nuclear agenda, and that this decision attested to the importance of the NPT to United 
States interests.253 The 2010 NPR focused on the increased risk of nuclear attack but in 
the context of terrorism, not large-scale, inter-state conflict. The threat of nuclear attack 
in the traditional inter-state context did not figure prominently in the 2010 NPR.  
Key decisions of the 2010 NPR reaffirmed the fundamental purpose of nuclear 
weapons in national security and proclaimed a smaller role. The 2010 NPR report 
restated U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Deployed and stockpiled weapons, SDVs, 
command and control capabilities, and infrastructure were deemed “essential” to 
deterrence and contributed to assurance of allies and partners and to promoting 
stability.254 The 2010 NPR report specified a reduced role for deterring non-nuclear 
attacks and referred to increasing reliance on non-nuclear deterrence. The primary 
rationale for nuclear weapons was explained in the Secretary of Defense’s 2012 report 
entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense as the 
ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” against an adversary. To the extent that 
deterrence objectives could be met with smaller forces, however, the United States would 
consider reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons in national security.255  
President Obama specified five objectives of the 2010 NPR, which were outlined 
in the report: prevent nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation; reduce the role of U.S. 
nuclear weapons in U.S. national security; maintain strategic deterrence and stability at 
reduced nuclear force levels; strengthen regional deterrence and reassure U.S. allies; and 
sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.256 The 2010 NPR report pointed to a 
reduced—or “more circumscribed”—role for nuclear weapons, given changed 
geopolitical realities since the end of the Cold War and progress on U.S.–Russian nuclear 
arms control, as evidenced by a 75 percent drop in the number of deployed strategic 
253 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release 
of Nuclear Posture Review,” April 6, 2010, 1. 
254 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 6. 
255 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, 2012), 5.  
256 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, iii. 
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weapons since the end of the Cold War, and a substantial reduction in the number of 
stockpiled weapons.257 The 2010 NPR report accepted a continuing fundamental 
deterrence role for nuclear weapons against potential adversaries and a role in assuring 
allies and partners, but also stated that the current Cold War force structure was outdated 
and “poorly suited” for countering current threats like terrorism and “unfriendly regimes” 
pursuing nuclear weapons.258 The 2010 NPR reiterated the fundamental purpose of 
nuclear weapons but reduced U.S. reliance on these weapons, as the cuts suggested.  
In considering the role of nuclear weapons, the 2010 NPR made key decisions 
regarding negative security assurances (NSAs) and “sole purpose.” The 2010 NPR report 
indicated that the United States was prepared to reinforce its long-established NSA policy 
with an important declaration: “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation 
obligations.”259 However, in the discussion of states not covered by the refined NSA, the 
U.S. government was not prepared to accept a “sole purpose” policy for nuclear weapons. 
Although the 2010 NPR NSA was characterized as a strengthening of existing policy, for 
states not subject to the NSA, including other nuclear-armed states, the U.S. government 
might consider nuclear weapons use in “a narrow range” of circumstances.260 The 
purpose of issuing the revised NSA was explicitly connected to assessments about 
increased conventional weapons capabilities, improved defenses (including missile 
defenses), and a corresponding reduction in the counter-WMD role for nuclear 
weapons.261  
In public statements, President Obama emphasized that the U.S. government’s 
declaration of an NSA included the important qualification about a potential target state 
257 Ibid., 45. 
258 Ibid., v. 
259 Ibid., 15. 
260 Ibid., 15, viii. 
261 Ibid., 16, 15. 
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being in compliance with nuclear nonproliferation “obligations.”262 The 2010 NSA 
included a qualification relating to special cases of potential destructiveness, and 
specified that the U.S. government reserved the right to adjust its policy on assurances.263 
NPR policy direction was clarified in congressional testimony by Ellen Tauscher, then 
the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, who stated that 
the NPR report strengthened “longstanding” policy, and explained that the U.S. 
government assessed its own “compliance judgments.”264 The 2010 NPR’s NSA and 
subsequent official clarifications with respect to states deemed to be demonstrably 
outside NPT compliance were meant to make it clear that states like Iran and North 
Korea did not fall under the revised NSA.265 The strengthened 2010 NSA was more 
accurately a clarified NSA meant to reduce ambiguity. As described in the 2010 NPR 
report, the role of nuclear weapons would be clearer (and less ambiguous) if NSAs were 
strengthened in U.S. declaratory policy.  
2. Theory of Deterrence  
Key strategic deterrence decisions in the 2010 NPR addressed strategic stability at 
lower force levels, proliferation, and arms control. The 2013 presidential guidance on 
nuclear employment strategy emphasized that forces were postured and planned to 
maintain strategic deterrence, “while still providing the capability to threaten credibly a 
wide range of nuclear responses if deterrence should fail.”266 Secretary Gates concluded 
about the 2010 NPR that it maintained stable deterrence while cutting approximately 50 
percent from START I force levels.267 The 2010 NPR sought to improve strategic 
stability with Russia and China by underlining transparency and mutual confidence to 
262 “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of Nuclear Posture Review,” 1–2. 
263 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 16. 
264 S. Hrg. 111–824: Nuclear Posture Review, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, 
111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2011, 61.  
265 Ibid., 37. 
266 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 8.  
267 DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates, Navy Admiral Mullen, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary 
Chu from the Pentagon, April 6, 2010, 1. 
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help set conditions for addressing proliferation.268 The authors of the 2010 NPR 
described a continuing need to maintain strategic stability with nuclear-armed state 
powers, but acknowledged that maintaining strategic stability at lower force levels would 
present persistent challenges. The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 
2011, and promoted a flexible nuclear deterrent with a broader framework for bilateral 
strategic weapons reductions. New START limited the United States and the Russian 
Federation to 1,550 accountable warheads on deployed SDVs, which were limited to 700 
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers and 800 SDVs in total. 
According to the testimony of Madelyn R. Creedon, then the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Global Strategic Affairs, the “New START Treaty will result in the lowest 
number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s,” when fully implemented.269 It 
should be noted that the George W. Bush administration made a similar statement about 
the 2002 Moscow Treaty, observing that the reduction in U.S. nuclear weapons would be 
“nearly 50 percent by 2012, which will result in the smallest stockpile since the 
Eisenhower administration.”270 New START represented the 2010 NPR’s focus on 
strategic deterrence (with Russia, not China).  
The 2010 NPR discussed arms control in relation to strategic deterrence and 
strategic stability. Two former Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and James 
Schlesinger, responded in testimony that they did not favor postponing arms control 
negotiations until after the completion of the 2010 NPR. Perry and Schlesinger expected 
that New START and the NPR would be closely coordinated, and that the NPR results 
would be based partly on Russian willingness to improve the strategic relationship with 
respect to force levels.271 Regarding strategic deterrence, the 2013 employment guidance 
stated: “The guidance narrows U.S. nuclear strategy to focus on only those objectives and 
268 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 7. 
269 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Nuclear Forces and Policies in Review of the Defense 
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014, 8. 
270 This quotation comes from a National Nuclear Security Administration press release of June 28, 
2006. For a contemporary source, see Matthew L. Wald, “U.S. to make deep cuts in stockpile of A-arms,” 
New York Times, June 4, 2004. 
271 S. Hrg. 111–218: The Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 
United States, Committee on Armed Services, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2010, 43.  
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missions that are necessary for deterrence in the 21st century. In so doing, the guidance 
takes further steps toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our security 
strategy.”272 The implication was that there were new deterrence requirements as distinct 
from those of the twentieth century.  
Regarding strategic stability, Rose Gottemoeller, then the Assistant Secretary of 
State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, and Edward Warner, 
then the Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-START Negotiations, in a 
discussion about retaining the nuclear triad, maintained that strategic stability would be 
assured by a second-strike capability in line with national deterrence guidance.273 
General Kevin Chilton, then the Commander, USSTRATCOM, considered deterrence 
stability at lower force levels in the same hearing in which Gottemoeller and Warner 
addressed the need for a second-strike capability. Chilton assessed that Russia would not 
be able to successfully cheat or break out of New START force limits because of the 
inherent survivability of the planned U.S. force structure, and the SSBNs in particular, 
and that additional Russian warheads would not nullify U.S. second-strike capabilities or 
deterrence stability.274 In his congressional remarks, John Kerry, then a U.S. Senator, 
described the reductions in deployed strategic warheads under New START as “a 
significant step forward” in the efforts to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals, and noted its 
“streamlined and effective new verification regime.”275 New START was seen as an 
important step on the path toward reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Among its 
key decisions, the 2010 NPR laid the groundwork for the New START arms control 
agreement.  
272 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment 
Strategy of the United States,” June 19, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the–press–
office/2013/06/19/fact–sheet–nuclear–weapons–employment–strategy–united–states. Appeared to be a new 
conception of deterrence requirements; important formulations of deterrence policy.  
273 S. Hrg. 111–897: The New START and the Implications for National Security, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, 406.  
274 Ibid., 253. 
275 S. Hrg. 111–738: The New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111–5), Hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, 1.  
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The key decisions of the 2010 NPR highlighted connections between assurance 
and nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and nonstrategic nuclear forces. The 2010 
NPR emphasized that nuclear weapons were still relevant in addressing particular 
security circumstances and that the reassurance mission remained essentially unchanged. 
Despite some fundamentally different deterrence challenges, according to the 2010 NPR, 
the United States was faced with maintaining strategic deterrence with major nuclear 
weapon powers. The U.S. government would require fewer nuclear weapons, powerful 
conventional forces, and the military forces of close allies and partners to address the 
challenges of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.276 Assurance of allies and extended 
deterrence were presented in the 2010 NPR as important for deterring threats and 
supporting nonproliferation goals. The 2010 NPR report concluded that the global 
nonproliferation regime would be strengthened and that U.S. allies and partners could be 
protected without their own nuclear weapons. The United States would demonstrate to 
various states that they did not need nuclear weapons and that pursuit of them would only 
harm their political and military interests. At the same time, regional security 
architectures would continue to include U.S. nuclear means as long as there are nuclear 
threats to the United States and its allies and partners.277 Extended deterrence was a 
conspicuous feature of the 2010 NPR, and assurance of allies was covered in some detail. 
The anxiety of some U.S. allies about changes in the security environment, including 
nuclear and missile proliferation, prompted desires for reaffirmations of U.S. security 
assurances. The 2010 NPR report argued that assurance failure could spur proliferation, 
undermine the NPT, and increase the possibility of nuclear use.278 General Chilton 
testified in 2010 about the importance of retaining the capability to forward-deploy U.S. 
nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and the importance of 
proceeding with full-scope life extension for the B-61 bomb, and he referred to forward-
deployed, nuclear-capable fighter aircraft as “enduring, visible manifestations of our 
Nation’s extended deterrence commitment to NATO, and a key component of a broader 
276 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 45. 
277 Ibid., 31. 
278 Ibid., 4. 
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strategy to accomplish U.S. nonproliferation and deterrence goals.”279 While 
emphasizing extended deterrence, the 2010 NPR noted that U.S. non-strategic nuclear 
weapons had been significantly cut since 1989, and that the United States only 
maintained a small number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, “plus a small number 
of nuclear weapons stored in the United States, available for global deployment in 
support of extended deterrence to allies and partners.”280 In considering deterrence and 
strategic stability, the 2010 NPR attempted to maintain the assurance of allies at lower 
force levels.  
3. Force Structure  
The 2010 NPR’s key decisions regarding force structure considered force levels, 
extended deterrence, potential reductions below New START levels, and Russia. 
According to the 2010 NPR report, President Obama directed the review of options for 
force level reductions below those associated with New START. Planning for possible 
force level reductions would consider objectives, numbers, conditions, and timelines, 
while maintaining deterrence objectives. The review determined that the requirement for 
“strict numerical parity” between the United States and Russia was less pressing due to 
various geopolitical developments—including a mellowing of U.S.–Russian 
competition—and the high levels of U.S. conventional military capabilities, which 
afforded the United States leeway to adjust its nuclear force structure to address 
challenges while maintaining “traditional” deterrence and assurance goals.281 According 
to the 2010 NPR, “Detailed NPR analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, 
conducted in spring 2009, concluded that the United States could sustain stable 
deterrence with significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming 
parallel Russian reductions.”282 Regarding numerical parity with the Russian Federation, 
General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, USSTRATCOM, in 2011–2013, added that he 
believed future force cuts should involve “all nuclear weapons.” Considering the U.S. 
279 S. Hrg. 111–824: Nuclear Posture Review, 55. 
280 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 27. 
281 Ibid., 6, 29–30. 
282 Ibid., 20. 
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and Russian force postures, Kehler identified no serious stability concerns in 
congressional testimony given in 2013.283 Tauscher said that New START sought 
strategic stability between the United States and Russia at lower force levels, but that the 
agreement was not tied to the development of nuclear weapons by other countries such as 
Iran or North Korea.284 In 2013 congressional testimony General James E. Cartwright, 
United States Marine Corps (Retired), and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering argued that 
a far-reaching and fundamental reformulation of nuclear policy and “architecture” was 
needed to maintain a credible deterrent against traditional state-based nuclear aggression, 
while “preserving strategic stability and protecting the nation against nuclear 
proliferation, terrorism, cyber warfare, failed states, organized crime, regional conflict 
and other threats the 21st century has wrought.”285 Russia was discussed in the 2010 
NPR report and subsequent testimony in relation to U.S. efforts to examine force cuts 
related to New START.  
Key force structure decisions in the 2010 NPR report were shaped by the force 
level changes associated with New START, but the administration considered enduring 
extended deterrence requirements. New START was characterized in the 2010 NPR 
report as an interim step in a longer process of bilateral nuclear arms reductions. New 
START was based on “conservative assumptions” to arrive at reasonable cuts in strategic 
nuclear forces.286 On the issue of going to zero, Miller stated—echoing language in the 
2010 NPR report—that the United States intended to examine future strategic- and non-
strategic nuclear arms cuts in conjunction with reviews of related changes in Russian 
283 H.A.S.C. No. 113–14: Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and 
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 113th Cong., 1st 
sess., 2013, 124. 
284 S. Hrg. 111–824: Nuclear Posture Review, 53. 
285 S. Hrg. 112–813: Examining the Proper Size of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile to Maintain a 
Credible U.S. Deterrent, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 112th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 2013, 13. 
286 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 20. “Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing 
accountable U.S. strategic delivery vehicles by approximately 50 percent from the START level and 
reducing accountable strategic warheads by approximately 30 percent from the 2002 Moscow Treaty 
level.” Ibid., 25. 
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force structure, consistent with stability, deterrence, and assurance goals.287 Concerning 
the ability of the United States to maintain continuous at-sea, SSBN-based deterrent 
capability in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with SSBN surge capability in a crisis, the 
Department of Defense planned to extend the service life of Ohio-class SSBNs by a 
decade and launch an Ohio-class replacement that left “no gap in the U.S. sea-based 
strategic deterrent capability.”288 U.S. New START planning included important 
elements with respect to future force structure. Administration officials argued that “The 
inclusion in the New START treaty of the definitions of ‘deployed’ and ‘nondeployed’ 
ICBMs and SLBMs as well as provisions for excluding conventional-only B-1B bombers 
and U.S. SSGN submarines from accountability against treaty limits, the converting of 
individual SLBM launch tubes on U.S. SSBNs, and the converting of a subset of the B-
52H fleet to a conventional-only capability, all contribute to the U.S. ability to sustain a 
robust nuclear triad under the New START treaty’s central limits.”289 The 2010 NPR 
report called for prudent reductions in strategic nuclear forces while preserving critical 
advanced conventional capabilities.  
The 2010 NPR report fairly explicitly laid out associated analysis about the role 
of the nuclear triad in the force structure. The 2010 NPR report revealed four underlying 
requirements for the nuclear triad: retain second-strike capability; retain sufficient 
strength in each triad leg to allow for maintenance of strategic deterrence given the 
failure of one leg due to “technological problems or operational vulnerabilities”; retain 
excess numbers to allow for non-nuclear global strike capabilities (e.g., conventionally-
armed ICBMs or SLBMs); and retain “needed” resources and capabilities in the nuclear 
complex over the long-term (i.e., at least several decades).290  
287 H.A.S.C. 112–12: Status of the United States Strategic Forces, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 
of the Committee on Armed Services, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, 124. 
288 U.S. Department of Defense, “November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act 
of FY2010: Section 1251 Report—New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,” 
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General Kehler testified that USSTRATCOM did not concur with the 
recommendation to reduce Ohio-class missile tubes from 20 to 16 considering the 
contemporary security environment. “If the strategic environment deteriorated today,” 
Kehler argued, “our only option to increase the number of deployed SLBM weapons is to 
upload weapons, which is limited by the number of tubes/SSBN.”291 Kehler observed 
that the “future strategic environment, policy, and capabilities of the Triad will ultimately 
determine how many ORP [Ohio Replacement Program] SSBNs, new bombers, and new 
ICBMs are required.”292  
According to Obama administration statements, the force structure assumptions of 
the 2010 NPR formed the going-in guidance for the New START negotiations, and those 
force limits were agreed to by the “entire” interagency.293 The 2010 NPR arrived at the 
key decision to sustain the strategic triad, and this in turn supported the Department of 
Defense decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent and proceed with the 
Naval Reactors program, which would “continue reactor plant design and development 
efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of long-lead reactor plant components in 2017, in 
support of Navy procurement of the first Ohio-class submarine replacement in 2019.”294  
The 2010 NPR endorsed analyses of new and updated triad capabilities including 
a follow-on ICBM to the Minuteman III and future long-range bomber capabilities.295 
Senator Carl Levin said that the 2010 NPR would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
national security policy and change the way policy makers viewed nuclear weapons, 
while shoring up U.S. nonproliferation goals and expanding the U.S. conception of 
deterrence.296 The 2010 NPR report recommended that, given the proposed force 
reductions under New START, the United States retain the nuclear triad—ICBMs, 
291 H.A.S.C. 112–12: Status of the United States Strategic Forces, 122. 
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SLBMs, and strategic bombers—but in smaller numbers.297 To allow for the contribution 
of non-nuclear systems on the achievement of regional deterrence and assurance goals, 
the 2010 NPR specified that New START would not cover missile defenses and would 
not “preclude” the use of “heavy bombers” and long-range missile systems in 
conventional roles.298 Although the 2010 NPR referred to “avoiding limitations on 
missile defenses in New START,” there was an exception to this principle. The U.S. 
Senate’s resolution for ratification for New START pointed out that paragraph 3 of 
Article V of the New START Treaty prohibited the use of ICBM and SLBM launchers 
“for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.”299 Key decisions of the 2010 
NPR preserved the force structure flexibility which underlies the concept of the nuclear 
triad.  
B. PUBLIC DEBATES  
The official claims made for the significance of the 2010 NPR were numerous: 
reducing the role of nuclear weapons; extending a less ambiguous negative security 
assurance; modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to maintain a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear deterrent; pursuing the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world; and laying 
the groundwork for a historic arms control agreement (New START) with Russia—
including dramatic force reductions and a “comprehensive” monitoring framework.300 
Public debates about the 2010 NPR revolved around the force reductions implied by the 
pursuit of nuclear disarmament, the elevation of terrorism as a nuclear threat, and the new 
NSA. The 2010 NPR promised to be significant with its links (however tangential) to the 
“global zero” movement, New START, and a revised NSA.  
297 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 21. 
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1. Force Levels, Nuclear Triad, and Modernization 
Public debates about the force structure and force level recommendations in the 
2010 NPR revolved around force modernization and the force levels required for strategic 
deterrence. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris concluded that the Obama administration 
had a valuable opportunity to update nuclear policy, break with past policy ideas, 
facilitate future nuclear force reductions, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
policy and strategy, and improve international security. Kristensen and Norris argued that 
New START force levels were still too high, even given the requirement to deter Russian 
nuclear attack or nuclear attack from any other nuclear-armed challenger.301 In contrast, 
John P. Caves argued that a policy focus on steady force reductions to zero risked 
extending the neglect of nuclear force modernization.302  
According to the 2012 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, 
which was made part of House Armed Services Committee testimony, obsolete Cold War 
conceptions of threats and left over Cold War strategy sustained unnecessarily high force 
levels—more than were required for contemporary deterrence requirements—and which 
were at best marginally useful for confronting threats like nuclear proliferation, terrorism, 
and cyberspace warfare.303 In making the point that minimum deterrence is not “fixed 
and absolute,” Nick Ritchie and Paul Ingram argued that international dialogue leading 
up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference revealed that a number of non-nuclear-weapon 
states were anxious to see “qualitative shifts” in nuclear weapon postures and smaller 
roles for nuclear weapons in the doctrines of nuclear-weapon states (rather than more 
quantitative reductions), based on the idea that reduced reliance would mean reduced 
chance of use and easier progress toward disarmament.304  
301 Kristensen and Norris, “Reviewing Nuclear Guidance,” 18–19. 
302 John P. Caves Jr., “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Strategic 
Forum, no. 252 (January 2010): 4.  
303 Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense 
Sequester? Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Armed Services, 113th 
Cong., 1st sess., 2013, 20. 
304 Nick Ritchie and Paul Ingram, “A Progressive Nuclear Policy: Rethinking Continuous–At–Sea 
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Proponents of the global zero agenda believed that nuclear dangers are linked to 
force numbers, and that lower numbers signify greater safety, but for Josef Joffe and 
James Davis, numbers alone were not that critical to nuclear deterrence and stability 
because stability is related to political incentives, not just numbers. Joffe and Davis 
argued that stability results from the shared understanding that no nuclear-weapon power 
may employ its weapons against another nuclear-weapon power without risking its own 
destruction. Survivable second-strike capabilities are critical to this balance.305 The 2010 
NPR debates about force levels included a reassessment of Cold War theories about 
strategic deterrence and stability similar to those advanced by Bernard Brodie and 
Thomas Schelling.  
Nuclear triad debates following the 2010 NPR were marked by extended 
deterrence, arms control, and modernization concerns. Some commentators revisited the 
ideas that Cold War force levels were kept artificially high based on exaggerated fears 
about the fragility of great power peace and inflated challenges about the requirements 
for maintaining strategic deterrence. The authors of a 2013 Cato Institute study concluded 
that “A submarine-based monad, along with conventional capability, can provide all the 
deterrence we need, and save roughly $20 billion a year. A dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs 
saves much less, but has a better chance of enactment due to the politics of bombers.”306 
The authors were referring to the interests of the “bomber community and their political 
supporters” to maintain bomber force levels.307  
In contrast, a Center for Strategic and International Studies monograph, also from 
2013, argued that the 2010 NPR had correctly recommended the retention of a survivable 
nuclear triad as the best approach for sustaining strategic stability for the cost and to 
mitigate the possible challenges of technical and threat developments, but the report left 
305 Josef Joffe and James W. Davis, “Less Than Zero,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (2011): 3. 
306 Friedman, Preble, and Fay, The End of Overkill, 19. 
307 Ibid., 17. 
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open the idea that the future of the nuclear triad should be considered in future 
deliberations over force cuts.308  
A 2014 RAND study of the U.S. ICBM force noted that U.S. New START 
planning envisaged an ICBM force of 420 or less, but the 2010 NPR discussed wide-
ranging scenarios involving potential uses of ICBMs—or at least situations in which 
strategic weapons might deter, reassure, and help stabilize—such as maintaining strategic 
stability with China’s nuclear arsenal, addressing the nuclear activities of North Korea 
and Iran, and continuing U.S. nuclear guarantees—extended deterrence—to allies and 
partners.309 The ICBM forces recommended in the 2010 NPR were coordinated with the 
levels agreed under New START, and all Minuteman III missiles would carry only one 
warhead—or be “de-MIRVed,” the term used by the 2010 NPR. However, some analysts 
have questioned why the United States required an arsenal of that size, according to the 
authors of the RAND study entitled The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile Force.310  
While the 2010 NPR reaffirmed the U.S. need for a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear force, maintained through a smaller but complete nuclear triad, the Obama 
administration pledged to modernize the nuclear force complex (infrastructure and 
systems) over ten years. However, the $215 billion price estimated by the administration, 
according to some analysts, seemed to be quickly revealed as inadequate for the task and 
unaffordable in the context of defense budget restrictions.311 Evan Braden Montgomery, 
in a discussion of land-based missile and heavy bomber forces, argued in 2013 that 
postponing modernization would effectively mean “major” force cuts, given the 
advanced age of warheads and SDVs, the extended lead times to bring new capabilities 
on line, and the lack of personnel and facilities to restart nuclear weapons production if 
308 Clark A. Murdock, Stephanie Spies, and John Warden, Forging a Consensus for a Sustainable 
U.S. Nuclear Posture (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 36. 
309 Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, Christopher A. Mouton, Chad J.R. Ohlandt, S. Craig Moore, 
Raymond E. Conley, and Glenn Buchan, The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), xv. 
310 Ibid.,121–122.  
311 Murdock, Spies, and Warden, Forging a Consensus, 1. 
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needed.312 The 2010 NPR recharged arguments for and against major changes to the 
nuclear triad, but the 2010 NPR recommendations clearly pointed to retention.  
Public debates about the 2010 NPR and nuclear force structure directly involved 
issues of nuclear complex modernization and the ratification of New START. D’Anne 
Spence made an especially forceful argument for modernization. Spence argued that “any 
degradation” of the nuclear complex would weaken the strategic deterrent and concluded 
that the United States must maintain a focus on modernizing the entire nuclear enterprise, 
including nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure, at the same time as arsenals are 
reduced in size and steps are taken to achieve global disarmament.313  
Other commentators saw problems in pursuing simultaneously the goals of force 
reductions and nuclear complex modernization. According to Clark Murdock, Stephanie 
Spies, and John Warden, in a 2013 CSIS policy study, the Obama administration aimed 
to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while taking concrete steps toward abolishing 
nuclear arsenals worldwide. These goals presented a difficulty for U.S. force 
modernization. The administration’s nuclear disarmament objectives made a tough 
argument even more difficult, at a time when policy makers discovered that nuclear 
complex modernization was a much higher priority than they had earlier realized.314  
Daryl Kimball argued in 2012 that nuclear weapons that do not deter nuclear 
attack by an adversary should not be invested in, given fiscal constraints, and that rather 
than refurbish tactical nuclear weapons still deployed in Europe but not required for the 
defense of NATO allies, “Congress could save billions by directing the weapons 
laboratories to focus on replacing the tritium and radar components” of the B61-7 
strategic warhead.315 Kimball seemed to assume that adversaries may be deterred with 
far lower U.S. nuclear force levels. Kimball did not explain how to determine which U.S. 
312 Evan Braden Montgomery, The Future of America’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 26. 
313 D’Anne E. Spence, “Zero Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security Enterprise Modernization,” 
Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 121. 
314 Murdock, Spies, and Warden, Forging a Consensus, 64. 
315 Daryl G. Kimball, “Defuse the Exploding Costs of Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, 
December 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_12/Focus. 
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nuclear weapons do not have a deterrent effect, nor did he explain why the NATO allies 
at the Chicago Summit in May 2012 expressed firm support for maintaining U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe.  
The Obama administration’s perceived need for progress on the arms control 
agenda allowed officials with oversight of the nuclear infrastructure to secure the funding 
sorely needed to protect the viability of the strategic nuclear deterrent. Senators backed 
New START, which capped arsenals for the United States and Russia at historically low 
levels, in return for the Obama administration’s promise to request $185 billion over ten 
years for SDVs and infrastructure.316 Modernization plans and increases in proposed 
spending generated significant commentary and fueled the arguments of some long-
standing disarmament advocates.  
2. Arms Control, Assurance, and Strategic Deterrence 
Perceptions that the 2010 NPR was linked to the global zero agenda, and its real 
connections to New START, meant that deterrence theory debates tended to focus on 
arms control and strategic stability, nonproliferation, and deterrence at lower force levels. 
Charles Moxley, a professor at Fordham University School of Law, assessed that the 
2010 NPR report itself expressed no serious commitment to nuclear disarmament because 
going to zero was described as a long-term policy goal to be accomplished over a 
significant amount of time.317 Writing in 2011, David Baylor concluded that because of 
the difficulties in executing the coordinated disarmament of nuclear-weapon states and 
the perceived weakening of U.S. extended deterrence entailed by nuclear disarmament, 
the United States Air Force should reassess the non-strategic nuclear mission, and the 
Navy should pursue airborne nuclear delivery capabilities under the Air-Sea Battle 
concept to address bomber and forward-basing issues.318  
316 Murdock, Spies, and Warden, Forging a Consensus, 54. 
317 Charles J. Moxley Jr., “Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review: An Ambitious Program for Nuclear 
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318 David J. Baylor, “Considerations for a U.S. Nuclear Force Structure Below a 1,000–Warhead 
Limit,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2011): 69. 
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For some commentators, New START was less impressive than it appeared. 
According to George Perkovich, director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, President Obama lacked the support of his 
administration or party. Because nuclear disarmament did not appear to figure into the 
activities of the national security advisor, or the secretaries of state or defense, the nuclear 
disarmament agenda appeared at times to be predominantly tied to the president and vice 
president. Disarmament did not appear to be a priority for many members of the 
executive or legislative branches, Perkovich argued.319 Concerning the Prague agenda, or 
policy course, Perkovich noted that there was no effective mobilization of public opinion 
behind nuclear disarmament or nonproliferation agendas, nor an obvious elevation of 
related issues, including in the United States. The result was that after Prague there was 
an animated leader on the international stage prepared to reduce nuclear dangers with no 
broad base of support to make real change.320 Perkovich welcomed the New START 
Treaty but claimed that it required no “new thinking or action.”321 Obama’s nuclear 
policy was positively received by international audiences and led to judgments that it 
paved the way for a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference. According to Harald 
Müller, the reception of Obama’s nuclear policy (and particularly New START) at the 
2010 NPT Review Conference was remarkably positive. It was ignored only by Iran, and 
it was reluctantly accepted by Cuba.322  
In discussing the disadvantages of a smaller nuclear arsenal, Keith Payne declared 
that there was very little clear correlation between deterrent effect and force numbers and 
types, and that there was no warrant for attaching high deterrence confidence to any 
specific force structure.323 Considering critics who argued that a smaller arsenal would 
threaten the effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees, some commentators 
319 George Perkovich, “The Obama Nuclear Agenda One Year After Prague,” Policy Outlook, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2010, 12. 
320 Ibid., 2. 
321 Ibid. 
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responded that the Cold War experience with extended deterrence was not perfect. James 
Forsyth, B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub recalled that France developed its own 
nuclear capability, despite benefitting from U.S. extended deterrence protection in 
NATO, “highlighting the fact that security considerations are but one of many factors 
contributing to the development of a nuclear weapons program.” They concluded that 
“Security has always been relative, and deterrence is no different; a small number of 
nuclear weapons are all that is needed to achieve relative security.”324 President Obama 
reenergized proponents of a nuclear disarmament agenda and concluded New START to 
punctuate the key strategic deterrence decisions of the 2010 NPR, but public debates did 
not suggest any broad-based nuclear disarmament movement, in contrast with the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  
Aspects of assurance and extended deterrence figured in public debates about the 
2010 NPR’s theory of deterrence. Michael Wheeler argued in 2010 that while many of 
the fundamental models of extended deterrence remained essentially as they were during 
the Cold War, U.S. policy makers should devote more attention to security partners to 
ensure the effectiveness of extended deterrence in a more multipolar, rapidly changing 
and unpredictable world. Wheeler noted that U.S. extended deterrence entailed more than 
a nuclear dimension, a point emphasized in the 2010 NPR. According to Wheeler, U.S. 
security guarantees are tied to perceptions by security partners that the United States is 
effectively “adapting to shifting power alignments in ways that security partners find 
acceptable.”325  
Harald Müller concluded that different states saw what they wanted in the 2010 
NPR report. Traditional nuclear-weapon states saw continuity, especially in the centrality 
of deterrence; Eastern European states saw “reassurance”; and NATO members interested 
in nuclear disarmament saw a viable policy path forward.326  
324 James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Minimum Deterrence and its 
Critics,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2010): 8, 10. 
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Baker Spring advocated that Congress pressure the Obama administration to 
prioritize nonproliferation over arms control, along with maintaining a modernized 
nuclear weapons complex, retain the option to use nuclear weapons in defense, and 
maintain operational flexibility in the nuclear force.327  
Paul Meyer argued that the 2010 NPR, conducted in a transparent manner and 
resulting in a public final report, was meant to signal to allies and partners that U.S. 
extended deterrence is robust, and that it was meant to complement the administration’s 
progressive foreign policy.328 In sum, the 2010 NPR revived debates about the means 
and importance of assuring allies and partners.  
The 2010 NPR also provoked public debates about strategic deterrence. The 2010 
NPR report clearly drew links between policies such as “de-MIRVing” and the broad 
international security concept of stability. James Acton analyzed the NPR report and 
discovered extensive uses of the word “stability” and its variations (49 uses in the main 
body of the report). Many uses related to de-MIRVing and the idea that this ICBM force 
change promoted stability by reducing incentives for a first strike.329 According to David 
Yost, the United States, with the 2010 NPR and the recommendation for de-MIRVing, 
reaffirmed a stability concept advanced by some Cold War theorists, but at the same time 
Washington recognized that Russia through its actions has demonstrated that it has not 
adopted the force characteristics prescribed by some U.S. theorists that are intended to 
bolster strategic stability.330 Yost concluded that such dissonance between U.S. and 
Russian conceptions of the requirements of strategic stability is relevant to allies that rely 
327 See Baker Spring, “Nuclear Posture Review’s Missing Objective: Defending the U.S. and Its 
Allies Against Strategic Attack,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 2400, Heritage Foundation, 
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on U.S. extended deterrence assurances; he noted that some allied observers have raised 
questions about the consistency of U.S. policy.331  
A 2011 paper in Science and Global Security countered the 2010 NPR claim that 
reducing alert levels would decrease crisis stability by creating incentives to strike first 
before re-alerting could be completed. The authors constructed a model indicating that a 
two-echelon force at different alert levels would eliminate first strike incentives because 
both sides would remain vulnerable to second strike retaliation. According to their model, 
there would be no reason to engage in “preemptive” re-alerting, because “second strike 
stability” would remain effective.332  
Hans Rühle seemed to counter, at least partially, the argument outlined above. 
Rühle asserted that there was no basis for policy making based exclusively on 
assumptions about rational actors leading nuclear weapon states. In Rühle’s view, 
eventual deterrence failure is effectively assured, given a “multinuclear world,” and 
threats of a nuclear second strike to bolster deterrence against irrational adversaries “will 
not work.”333 Far from being a Cold War relic, for some writers, it is clear that strategic 
deterrence—especially with respect to Russia and China—remained relevant to U.S. 
nuclear posture calculations and decisions following the 2010 NPR.  
3. Negative Security Assurances, “Sole Purpose,” and First Use 
Public debates concerning the 2010 NPR’s redefined NSA included arguments 
about disarmament and a reduced role for nuclear weapons. Keith Payne considered 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s biological weapons exception—that all response 
options would be considered in response to a biological weapon (BW) attack—a “useful 
331 Ibid. 
332 Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, “One 
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Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science and Global Security 19, no. 3 
(2011): 186. 
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(2013): 93.  
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elaboration,” in congressional testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of 
the House Armed Services Committee.334  
According to Charles Moxley, a critic of U.S. nuclear policy, there was no 
evidence that other U.S. nuclear policies and war plans had been correlated to the NSA 
stated in the 2010 NPR, and the 2010 NSA had questionable legal standing. Moxley 
made the point that the 2010 NPR did not formalize the NSA in a legally binding treaty 
(it is a policy statement that may be altered unilaterally by the United States), and he 
suggested what he meant by formality: “The NPR does not provide any objective criteria 
on what constitutes compliance with a state’s nuclear nonproliferation obligations, nor 
does it establish materiality requirements as to levels of noncompliance. Unfortunately, 
the ambiguity of this part of the declaration and apparent subjectivity of the underlying 
determination renders the meaning of the declaration uncertain.”335 It might be noted that 
the NSAs of all nuclear-weapon states include the option to make unilateral changes; the 
U.S. NSA is not unique in this respect. 
Jonathan Pearl, a board member of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues in 2011, 
concluded that President Obama’s support for steps toward nuclear disarmament were not 
radical but politically measured, based on a long-standing policy formulation that 
eventual nuclear disarmament is in the U.S. interest, but that substantial moves in that 
direction should not be made at the expense of immediate security needs or requirements. 
The path to nuclear disarmament included major obstacles, Pearl continued, and some 
obstacles might require major international political shifts in thinking to overcome, 
meaning that the most likely policy steps would be gradual.336 President Obama’s public 
statements and efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons led some observers to 
conclude that the United States might completely eliminate its nuclear arsenal. But future 
U.S. nuclear weapons policy is actually “uncertain,” Pearl concluded, and popular 
accounts aside, President Obama’s policy is not dramatically different from U.S. policy 
334 H.A.S.C. 112–12: Status of the United States Strategic Forces, 32. 
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sixty-five years ago—that is, prioritizing arms control and nonproliferation incentives in 
the near-term, and disarmament in the long-term.337  
Stephen Herzog, a nuclear disarmament and arms control researcher, wrote in 
2010 that the Obama administration had achieved concrete steps toward effectively 
realigning U.S. nuclear weapons policy with other U.S. goals such as nonproliferation. 
Herzog highlighted that Obama administration efforts entailed steps to revitalize the 
international arms control agenda and nonproliferation regime. The 2010 NPR report was 
regarded by some observers as successfully reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
national security. The United States under President Obama successfully hosted a 
Nuclear Security Summit and concluded the New START Treaty.338 The new NSA was 
positively received by some commentators but still drew criticism, primarily from 
staunch nuclear disarmament advocates such as Moxley.  
Public debates surrounding the 2010 NPR regarding the role of nuclear weapons 
retouched the issues of fundamental purpose and nuclear disarmament. In their 2010 
article, “Salvaging Global Zero: Diplomacy in the Second Nuclear Age,” Joachim Krause 
and Benjamin Schreer concluded that the 2010 NPR did not represent a significant break 
with earlier policy. The authors argued that the “basic tenets” of U.S. nuclear strategy 
were left undisturbed, and that New START was equally conservative—because nuclear 
weapons remained essential for U.S. military strategy, and for international security and 
stability. Continuity was reflected in traditional force structure recommendations such as 
the retention of the nuclear triad and continuing deployment of nonstrategic weapons in 
Europe.339  
Then an instructor in international security at Melbourne University, Aiden 
Warren observed in 2011 that, despite the statements that the 2010 NPR had moved the 
U.S. nuclear posture away from Cold War thinking, the Obama administration actually 
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338 Stephen Herzog, “Obama, Nuclear Disarmament, and Ballistic Missile Subs,” Bellum: A Project of 
the Stanford Review, August 6, 2010, http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=2632. 
339 Joachim Krause and Benjamin Schreer, “Salvaging Global Zero: Diplomacy in the Second Nuclear 
Age,” RUSI Journal 155, no. 3 (2010): 44. 
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found it very difficult to advance policies in line with nonproliferation and disarmament 
goals, and that the role of nuclear weapons has been reduced very little. Warren referred 
to the 2010 NPR as “moribund in old postures,” and contrasted bold rhetorical aims with 
very limited actual change. The “moderate” NPR, Warren suggested, did not abandon the 
“Bush strategy.” Warren characterized the results of the Nuclear Security Summit and the 
NPT Review Conference as formulaic; the NPR report did not change the role of nuclear 
weapons to the extent suggested by earlier Obama administration policy declarations.340  
In a wide-ranging critique of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Thérèse Delpech 
suggested the disarray of Obama administration policy by writing that China “continued 
increasing and improving its ballistic and nuclear arsenal as well as its space and cyber 
capabilities” while Russia embraced a more aggressive nuclear doctrine (in February 
2010), at the same time that the Obama administration NPR deliberated for months on 
how to characterize the objective of nuclear weapons, finally adopting the phrase 
“fundamental purpose” in order to include the possibility of a nuclear response to a 
biological attack.341 Thus, one seasoned analyst clearly suspected that a damaging 
realignment of U.S. nuclear weapons policy goals had been advanced through the 2010 
NPR.  
Keith Payne observed that the Obama administration had stated commitments to 
maintaining an effective and credible deterrent, but the 2010 NPR report suggested a 
change in priorities, notably in its language about international nonproliferation priorities 
and steps toward global nuclear disarmament. Payne asserted that there would be 
inevitable and substantial “trade-offs” that would affect U.S. capabilities to assure, deter, 
and defend.342  
Paul Schulte reasoned that the devaluation of nuclear weapons with no eventual 
global disarmament would be hard for policy makers to back, and that political elites 
340 Aiden Warren, “The Promises of Prague Versus Nuclear Realities: From Bush to Obama,” 
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“embedded within most strategic cultures” would be wary of complete abolition even if 
they did not reveal their concerns publically.343 This might help to explain the lack of 
broad practical support from governments that President Obama received after endorsing 
something interpreted as a call for nuclear disarmament.  
Three experts writing for the National Defense University observed that Obama 
policy advisors had worked to develop some capacity to address “large-scale WMD 
crises,” and that important organizational changes were implemented to facilitate 
administration counter-WMD goals, most prominently, Obama’s high-profile nuclear 
weapons agenda, which was closely associated with nuclear disarmament—an agenda 
calibrated to bolster international nonproliferation efforts, and especially to counter 
nuclear proliferation.344  
Thérèse Delpech observed of the 2010 NPR report that putting countering nuclear 
terrorism and proliferation at the top of the list of priorities and putting maintaining 
strategic deterrence third was “weird.”345 Paul Schulte observed that there has not 
necessarily been a significant devaluation of nuclear weapons in the United States, 
though Russia has reasserted a commitment to nuclear deterrence, reinstated nuclear 
doctrine, and reemphasized the role of theater nuclear weapons in balancing conventional 
weaknesses. Schulte argued that to protect the credibility of U.S extended deterrence and 
keep allies from pursuing nuclear weapons programs, and to maintain sufficient 
reassurance of allies and partners, the 2010 NPR recommended against a “no first use” 
(NFU) pledge, to maintain ambiguity, a policy long followed by France and the United 
Kingdom, which accept the value of keeping ambiguity foremost in the minds of 
potential adversaries.346 Some 2010 NPR commentators saw no change in role or 
purpose partly because there was no profound change in force structure. There were 
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sustained critiques about high rhetoric but low-impact actions addressing long-standing 
policy issues.  
The 2010 NPR revived issues related to first-use. Scott Sagan argued that an 
unambiguous NFU declaratory policy would negatively impact deterrence by reducing 
the risk calculations of an adversary considering using chemical or biological weapons 
attacks—that the United States would respond with nuclear weapons—but it would also 
reduce the likelihood that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons first.347  
Contrary to Sagan’s NFU argument, Timothy Fischer, in a U.S. Army War 
College study from 2012, countered that the United States should retain a policy of 
possible nuclear response to WMD because of the important role of ambiguity in national 
security policy flexibility and deterrence. Fischer recommended that the United States 
maintain the flexibility of an ambiguous response policy because other states have 
declared the option to respond to WMD attacks with nuclear weapons. In Fischer’s view, 
the United States should not rule out a nuclear response to deter hostile states or non-state 
actors from attacking the United States or its allies.348  
Sagan recommended in 2009 that the 2010 NPR review more than deterrence 
requirements, and that it analyze of the impact of U.S. declaratory policy on nuclear 
proliferation, the consequences of proliferation, and “perceptions of the illegitimacy of 
nuclear terrorism.”349 He argued that a broad review agenda would conclude with the 
adoption of an NFU policy, based on a “sole purpose” argument that U.S. nuclear 
weapons serve exclusively to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapon states 
against the United States, its allies, and its armed forces. Sagan added that the United 
States should be able to respond with an “appropriate” array of nuclear second-strike 
options, if necessary, if deterrence fails.350  
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Michael Gerson argued that the 2010 NPR failed to capitalize on an opportunity 
to substantially alter U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Gerson concluded that policy makers 
were trying to keep the president’s options open, but classical deterrence theory based on 
ideas of Thomas Schelling about self-limiting options could enhance deterrence and 
promote strategic stability. In Gerson’s view, adopting an NFU policy and taking the 
first-use option off the table would firm up crisis stability, reinforce conventional 
deterrence, and afford the United States added leadership leverage and legitimacy 
concerning international nonproliferation.351 In sum, the first-use debates provoked by 
the 2010 NPR were not extensive but revived arguments dating from the Cold war about 
crisis stability and strengthening deterrence.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
David Lonsdale of the University of Hull observed in 2013 that the unique 
challenge of nuclear strategy is how a state may “harness” the overwhelming destructive 
power of nuclear weapons as an instrument for achieving the ends of policy.352 Michael 
Rühle noted that American strategy has shifted with each administration since the end of 
the Cold War in 1991.353 Rühle’s observation may be extended to the three Nuclear 
Posture Reviews. Each administration attempted to define a transformative nuclear 
strategy. The NPRs have had a mixed record in guiding national security policy 
concerning nuclear weapons. Policies regarding the roles of nuclear weapons and theories 
of deterrence have marked the different approaches of the post–Cold War U.S. 
administrations, but the NPRs have been mostly justifications for force structure plans, 
with some attention to revising declaratory policy. 
A. SUMMARY 
All three NPRs reviewed to some extent whether nuclear weapons can be said to 
have a sole purpose: to deter and counter nuclear attacks by an adversary. The 1994 NPR 
accepted that a fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons was to deter large attacks and to 
be prepared to inflict massive damage, but it also recognized other uses, including 
reinforcing the security guarantees behind extended deterrence. The 1990s policy debates 
ended with two clear policy approaches, one based on a “sole purpose” role and one 
based on a multi-purpose role for nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR clearly identified a 
broader array of potential threats that the United States needed to be prepared to counter, 
as compared to the 1994 NPR; and the 2001 NPR appeared to broaden the roles of 
nuclear weapons by linking them to multiple defense policy goals. Debates over the roles 
of nuclear weapons in the 2001 NPR were dominated by concerns over proliferation, 
different conceptions of “new” threats including nuclear terrorism, and whether such 
exigencies required the development of newer and more usable nuclear weapons. The 
352 Lonsdale, “Obama’s Second Term,” 460. 
353 See Michael Rühle, “Continuity in America’s Nuclear Strategy,” Politische Studien 60, no. 427 
(2009): 74–77. 
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2010 NPR repeated long-standing policy on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons, 
elevated nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as threats, and attempted to clarify 
the role of nuclear weapons through a revised NSA. The 2010 NSA was well-received by 
some commentators, but others were disappointed that the role of nuclear weapons had 
not actually changed substantially and that the overall U.S. strategic nuclear force 
structure remained a triad. Many decisions and debates tended to assume a correlation 
between the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear force structure, force levels and the mix 
of strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). 
The NPRs attempted to redefine deterrence in the absence of the Soviet Union—
the main U.S. preoccupation during the Cold War. Even though mutual assured 
destruction (MAD) was understood to be outdated, the 1994 NPR did not describe 
deterrence in terms substantially different from those predominant during the Cold War. 
Debates following the 1994 NPR exhibited different attempts to understand the 
applicability of deterrence stability in a multi-power environment and whether the United 
States could return to a position of enjoying high-confidence deterrence given post–Cold 
War threats.  
Tailored deterrence seemed to influence ideas that were worked out in the 2001 
NPR; tailored deterrence looked like it might provide the answer to how deterrence could 
be effectively achieved against post–Cold War threats. While the 2001 NPR was 
concerned with restoring some utility to nuclear weapons and some credibility to U.S. 
deterrent threats, critics charged that its efforts might increase the likelihood of nuclear 
use by expanding the opportunities for deterrence.  
The 2010 NPR refocused on strategic deterrence and strategic stability (New 
START with Russia was an overt example) and prominently discussed extended 
deterrence and assurance of allies and partners. Debates about deterrence and the 2010 
NPR focused on how the United States might maintain traditional deterrence objectives at 
lower force levels. Work completed in exploring new forms of deterrence beyond the 
bipolar superpower context, especially related to and following the 2001 NPR, was 
promising but not emphasized in the 2010 NPR. 
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All three NPRs attempted to reduce force structure without reducing what were 
perceived to be needed deterrence and defense capabilities. Each of the three NPRs was 
closely associated with a strategic arms control agreement with Russia. The 1994 NPR 
aimed to reduce force levels—and hence reduce the role of nuclear weapons, according to 
official policy statements—but protect capabilities by maintaining a “hedge” force of 
stockpiled warheads (within START II limits). Debates about the 1994 NPR force 
structure were shaped by public perceptions that defense spending should be reduced and 
that nuclear weapons were no longer needed in the same way as during the Cold War. 
The George W. Bush administration dramatically reduced operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads but also employed a “hedging” approach by reserving 
warheads for possible future use. Most significantly, the Bush administration enacted a 
new force structure plan—in the form of the New Triad—that aimed to deemphasize the 
role of nuclear weapons while increasing defense planning flexibility. Public debates over 
the 2001 NPR’s force structure were deeply colored by claims that the nuclear force cuts 
were disingenuous and that the New Triad blurred the distinctions between nuclear and 
non-nuclear missions, and thus lowered the nuclear use threshold. The 2010 NPR 
emphasized the need to make reasonable nuclear force cuts while preserving recent 
advances in missile defenses and conventional weapons capabilities and retaining a 
nuclear triad. Public debates over the 2010 NPR force structure returned to perennial 
arguments about the necessity of a triad and the role of nuclear complex modernization in 
meeting deterrence requirements. The NPRs have been used to justify force structure 
decisions and consequently the debates related to the NPRs have been dominated by 
force structure concerns and requirements. 
B. ANALYSIS  
The nuclear weapons policy issues that affected the NPRs included whether a 
narrow, counter-nuclear only role would be preferable to a wider role across a range of 
threat scenarios, and whether to retain a first-use option.354 Though each NPR 
proclaimed the need for a new nuclear weapons policy, actual declaratory policy, with 
354 See T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the 
Global Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), Ch. 2. 
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respect to possible first use, the multi-purpose (not “sole purpose”) function, and NSAs 
has remained largely consistent, except for the adjustment in the NSA in the 2010 NPR. 
Important to the evolution of post–Cold War U.S. nuclear strategy have been domestic 
and international perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons and their roles. According 
to Paul Davis, a gradual reduction in the apparent willingness of the United States to 
respond with nuclear weapons has gradually eroded the credibility of nuclear use threats 
since the 1960s.355 According to Harald Müller, a German commentator, the most 
significant nuclear weapons policy “success” of the Obama administration has been the 
reversal in international perceptions that the United States was undermining the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and devaluing the Nonproliferation Treaty.356  
Present in all three NPRs was a central effort to reformulate and reassert 
rhetorical designs to win political support for elements of declaratory policy, especially 
with regard to reducing the role of nuclear weapons. For example, the 2010 NPR 
garnered unusual attention as an extension of President Obama’s public declarations 
about nuclear disarmament, but the key decisions of the 2010 NPR report were relatively 
conservative and similar to those of earlier NPRs. 
Although many aspects of U.S. nuclear strategy remained uniform across the 
three NPRs, there have been important changes. Thomas Scheber concluded in 2007 that 
since the end of the Cold War policy makers have made concerted efforts to remake U.S. 
“strategic capabilities” to better address the threats of the current security environment 
while reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR’s New Triad was a 
higher-profile example of such an attempt.357  
Nuclear arsenals overall have shrunk in size and variety in France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. (They continue to expand elsewhere, notably in China 
and Pakistan.) Each of the three NPRs professed an intention to rethink all aspects of 
deterrence requirements, given an assessment of the contemporary threat environment. 
355 Davis, Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions, 7. 
356 Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test,” 219. 
357 Thomas Scheber, “U.S. Nuclear Policy and Strategy and the NPT Regime: Implications for the 
NATO Alliance,” Comparative Strategy 26, no. 2 (2007): 125. 
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The three NPRs each concluded that deterrence was essential to U.S. national security 
interests and policy goals. The Obama administration’s 2010 NPR shaped U.S. nuclear 
strategy by elevating nuclear terrorism and proliferation as threats, emphasizing advances 
in conventional weapon capabilities that suggested a shrinking role for nuclear weapons, 
and establishing paths for potential further force reductions. President Obama generally 
succeeded in steering the 2010 NPR in line with his earlier policy vision and direction, 
but his administration’s actual statements on the purposes of nuclear weapons and NSAs 
were not revolutionary. They were evolutionary and reaffirmed earlier policy 
formulations for the most part, aside from the 2010 NPR’s NSA. There were attempts 
during the NPRs to arrive at new conceptions of deterrence but the fundamentals of 
strategic deterrence remained essentially unchanged. The recognition that all actors 
would not respond to deterrent threats similarly was nonetheless an important advance in 
deterrence understanding. It was reflected in official interest in “tailored deterrence.” 
Each of the three NPRs emphasized the importance of policy recommendations 
made in light of an uncertain future, which consistently led to the strategy of maintaining 
a so-called hedge force. The 1994 NPR produced an explicit “hedge” force, the 2001 
NPR also emphasized hedging against uncertainty, and Secretary Gates spoke publically 
about a hedge force in relation to the 2010 NPR. The most influential outcome of the 
Clinton administration NPR was in fact the hedge force.  
The most influential nuclear weapons policy decision—in the sense having a 
lasting impact—of the Bush administration was the establishment of a New Triad meant 
to strengthen national security by making the nuclear weapons arsenal and nuclear 
weapons complex more robust and responsive to defense policy requirements. 
Responsiveness was defined not only as the ability to reconstitute a larger arsenal in a 
short period, but also as a capacity to devise new types of weapons and associated assets. 
Although the Obama administration did not retain the George W. Bush administration 
“New Triad” concept, it has acknowledged the importance of maintaining a responsive 
infrastructure.  
The Obama administration’s NPR attracted substantial attention with the 
perceived link to the “global zero” agenda, but ambitious plans for nuclear disarmament 
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were not new in 2010. The NPRs expressed an aspiration that had already been long- 
established. The NPRs were important indicators of what had already been accepted by 
policy makers about the role of nuclear weapons in meeting deterrence requirements. The 
NPRs did not serve as instruments to chart entirely new policy courses. They signaled 
changes in tack, not course, despite the declared claims of each administration.  
C. CONCLUSION  
The NPRs as official products were meant to speak primarily to the nation’s 
nuclear posture. The sensitive nature of nuclear weapons issues meant that not a few 
commentators highlighted the most controversial aspects of nuclear policy. The NPRs 
were deliberative processes focused on the nation’s nuclear force posture, but their 
impact on policy and strategy was widely accepted by policy makers, policy advocates, 
and commentators. Each of the NPRs aimed to change the nuclear posture in particular 
ways; all three NPRs made overt claims to breaking with past thinking and 
recommending fundamental force posture changes. In each case, the proposed changes 
included a significant declaratory component. U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements have 
changed since the end of the Cold War as a result of changes in the international threat 
environment and the demands of other national policies. Compared with the Cold War, 
the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal features smaller numbers of warheads and fewer types 
of warheads and delivery systems, but the overall deterrence posture is more complex, 
due to the emergence of cyber capabilities, among other factors. The NPRs helped to 
clarify U.S. nuclear weapons policy objectives and explain the relevance of nuclear 
weapons policy in conjunction with other national policy goals. U.S. deterrence 
objectives have remained fairly stable; definitions of deterrence requirements have 
changed markedly across each post–Cold War administration.  
Continuities across the NPRs include the reduced role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, 
deterrence objectives keyed to contemporary threats, and a force structure that 
emphasizes diverse capabilities with lower nuclear force levels. Nuclear weapons policy 
issues are not going away anytime soon, because U.S. national security strategy continues 
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to emphasize the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and the central role 
of deterrence in ensuring U.S. and allied security and international stability.  
Fundamental issues concerning nuclear deterrence requirements for U.S. national 
security nonetheless remain unresolved. Fundamentally different views, interpretations, 
and priorities persist about how to deter adversaries, the nature of national security 
threats, and the merits of nuclear forces in the national deterrence posture.  
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